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"ANOTHER SUCH VICTORY AND WE ARE
UNDONE": A CALL TO AN AMERICAN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
William Bradford*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 279 B.C., Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, a city-state in Greece, was summoned
by the people of Tarentum, a Greek colony in southern Italy, to aid them against
the tyranny of Rome. At the Battle of Asculum, Pyrrhus defeated the Roman
legions after two days of bloody combat in which he lost a great many of his most
competent officers and many of his men. When congratulated on the victory by a
subordinate, Pyrrhus, far from home and unable to replace his losses with fresh
troops-unlike the Romans, who only needed to outlast Pyrrhus on their home
soil-is reported to have said, "Another such victory and we are undone." This
statement gave rise to the expression "Pyrrhic victory," used to describe a triumph
accompanied by such enormous losses that it is the functional equivalent of a
defeat. Indeed, soon after the Battle of Asculum, Pyrrhus, unable to continue the
campaign, abandoned the Italian Greeks and sailed for Epirus.1
2United States v. Lara, hailed as a rare victory by proponents of Indian self-
determination,3 is, under closer scrutiny, no less Pyrrhic a victory than the Battle
of Asculum. Although the opinion upheld the essential power of Indian tribes4 to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians,5 in so doing it granted
* Chiricahua Apache and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis, Indiana.
1. For a discussion of the Battle of Asculum and its historical significance, see Plutarch, Plutarch's
Lives vol. IX (Bernadotte Perrin trans., William Heinemann, Ltd. 1968).
2. 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
3. See infra n. 15 (defining "self-determination" under international law and in the context of
Indian sovereignty).
4. "Indian," "Indians," and "Indian tribe(s)" denote the indigenous inhabitants of the United
States in the singular, plural, and collective forms. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law
in North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 55, 55 n. 1 (1997). "'Native
American' is a [politically correct] term . . . [that] perpetuates colonial efforts to subordinate
indigenous sovereignty to mere ethnicity, as in the case of African-Americans or Irish-Americans."
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American
Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 235, 237 (1997).
5. In the absence of the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, tribes
are left with "no more governmental power than a club or a union or a church may exercise." Sen.
Comm. on Indian Affairs, Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and Authorities
of the Indian Tribal Governments, 107th Cong. 48 (Feb. 27, 2002) (prepared statement of William C.
1
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opportunities and ammunition to opponents of the centuries-long struggle to
defend what remains of Indian sovereignty against colonialism. Read with a
jaundiced eye, Lara simply reaffirms contemporary judicial understandings of the
doctrine of plenary power, long since remolded to connote not merely immunity
from judicial review but rather absolute authority over Indian tribes, while
telegraphing a message reminding readers that the radical readjustment of the
"metes and bounds",6 of tribal sovereignty, to include the legislative termination of
each and every Indian tribe and the abrogation of all four hundred plus Indian
treaties, requires only that Congress choose to wield its unbridled legislative
authority. If the right to make and enforce law is the most fundamental
constituent of sovereignty, 7 the sovereignty of Indian tribes, even post-Lara,
survives at the sufferance of Congress, and history suggests that its future is grim.
Non-Indians, contemplating the political and legal enormity of the task of
doing justice by the subjects of their policies of conquest, genocide, expropriation,
legal assaults on tribal land and sovereignty, and forced political and economic
dependency, have long bemoaned their "Indian problem." 9  At least it is a
problem of their own making; Indians, by contrast, have been saddled with a
"Euro-American problem"'0 created, maintained, and, as Lara reveals, as yet
unacknowledged by the political and legal system imposed and preserved by the
might of the conqueror. Federal Indian law, not just willfully blind to crucial
questions of agency and responsibility for past wrongs but often overtly racist, is
the current instrument of choice whereby a non-Indian majority thwarts the
assertion of sovereign tribal rights to engage in economic development projects
resulting in the transborder movement of goods and persons," the production of
Canby, Jr., Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). Moreover, because of jurisdictional
gaps created by the withdrawal of tribal jurisdiction in respect to broad categories of crimes and
persons, the absence of jurisdiction in tribes often dictates that no sovereign exercises criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations, a result that produces lawlessness and social
pathologies on reservations. See Natl. Am. Indian Ct. JJ. Assn., Indian Courts and the Future: Report
of the NAICJA Long Range Planning Project 33-35 (1978). For a discussion of the evolution and
consequences of the jurisdictional complexity in Indian country, see Robert N. Clinton, Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Ariz. L. Rev. 503 (1976).
6. 124 S. Ct. at 1635 (stating that the exercise of congressional plenary power over Indians
"inevitably involve[s] major changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty").
7. See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation,
and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1, 47-67 (2002-2003)
(identifying legal autonomy, along with powers of political and economic self-governance, as the core
constituents of sovereignty).
8. See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control
Law, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 899, 1005 (1998) (concluding that, on the basis of the history of
congressional legislation in derogation of Indian sovereignty, "[u]nless some drastic action is taken
soon.... Indian nations are in grave jeopardy").
9. Gertrude Bonnin, America's Indian Problem, in American Indian Stories 185-95 (Hayworth
Publg. H. 1921).
10. Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence 7 (Oxford U.
Press 1988) ("In its essence this [Euro-American] problem seems to have been tribal survival: the
maintenance of ... some measure of political autonomy in the face of invasion, conquest, and loss of
power.").
11. See generally Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 Or. L. Rev. 75, 111-13
(2003) (discussing the contemporary importance of tribal sovereignty claims in the context of economic
development projects that produce off-reservation effects).
[Vol. 40:71
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significant wealth, 2 or the expression of religious or cultural difference. 3 Simply
put, Lara, albeit a win for the "good guys," offers nothing to contradict the lesson
of more than two centuries of practice: federal Indian law, and in particular the
doctrines of plenary power and stare decisis, is the thinnest of veneers for "de
facto rule over both tribes and individual Indians without restraint and across all
manner of human affairs."' 4
Even if federal Indian law was not already structurally incompatible with the
self-determination15 of Indian nations and ready-made for exploitation by foes of
sovereign governments within the external borders of the United States, its
interpretation, guided by the dominant philosophies of Western liberal
jurisprudence and modern international legal positivism-the former distrustful of
12. See Rennard Strickland, Tonto's Revenge: Reflections on American Indian Culture and Policy
105 (U. N.M. Press 1997) (stating that when Indians engage successfully in economic development that
displaces dependency, and thus fail to "behav[e] in the forms that white society has historically defined
as the appropriate Indian form," the United States moves to check tribal sovereignty).
13. For an example of non-Indian intolerance of tribal economic development that implicates
religious and cultural differences between Indian and non-Indian worldviews, see William Bradford,
"Save the Whales" v. Save the Makah: Finding Negotiated Solutions to Ethnodevelopmental Disputes in
the New International Economic Order, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 155 (2000) (examining the religious and
ethical roots of the legal conflict between the Makah tribe and anti-whaling activists over the Makah
effort to resume whaling, a simultaneously sacramental and developmental practice, in the late 1990s).
14. Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and
Economics of Indian Self-Rule, Faculty Research Working Papers Series 7 (Harv. U. March 2004)
(available at http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/Research/wpapernsf/rwp/RWP04-016?OpenDocument).
For a discussion of the extent of federal control over every aspect of the affairs of Indian tribes, see
generally Bradford, supra n. 7.
15. Decolonization whetted interest in the customary international legal principle of self-
determination-the concept that institutions should be substantially and continuously guided by the
will of the governed. See U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55, 56, 73 (calling for mutual respect among nations
based on "self-determination of peoples"); Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 15, at art. 3, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration] ("Indigenous peoples have the right
[to] freely determine their political status and ... development."); Convention Concerning Indigenous
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Intl. Labour Organisation, 76th Sess., 28 I.L.M. 1382
(1989), at art. 6.2 [hereinafter Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples] (requiring states to consult
with indigenous peoples as to the formation and endowment of indigenous institutions and programs);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th
Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1971) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]
(charging states with duty to respect self-determination); International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, at art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR] ("All peoples have the
right [to] ... freely determine their political status and ...development."); Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11,
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (calling upon states to eliminate colonialism); Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) (calling for elimination of "alien subjugation"); Western Sahara,
1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Oct. 16) [hereinafter Western Sahara] (incorporating UNGA resolutions to "[f]ree
association [and] voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through
informed and democratic processes"); Josd R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 36th Sess., Agenda Item 11, at 74, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.8, 1 58-81 (1983) ("Self-determination... must be recognized as the basic
precondition for the enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their fundamental rights.").
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the Indian normative universe and thus bent upon remaking tribes to comport
with a secular, individualist model of governance, the latter unwilling to recognize
tribes as subjects of law and as bearers of natural legal rights actionable in
domestic and international courts-would prove hostile, and perhaps fatal, to
territorially based Indian sovereignty. Even under the moderating influence of
the most sympathetic members of the nonpolitical branch, judicial review of
questions of federal Indian law, on balance, has been an engine of the destruction
of tribal self-determination since the founding of the United States. Plenary
power and Indian sovereignty are mutually exclusive, and Lara only partially and
temporarily obscures the existential reality that, for Indians, federal Indian law is
an evil legal system.16 Rather than celebrate Lara, Indians should probe deeper
and ask themselves how long before Congress "fixes" it and divests tribes of non-
member Indian criminal jurisdiction, whether they intend to mount an effective
defense against the destruction of the last vestiges of their judicial sovereignty,
what instruments of power-legal, political, and moral-they can marshal in
support of this mission, and whether their right to self-determine can be
meaningfully exercised in continued association with the United States.
Part II of this article briefly sketches the ongoing historical process whereby
tribal sovereignty, once accorded great deference by the international community,
has been incrementally denatured and corroded by federal Indian law. Part III
situates Lara within this history and reframes the decision as a Pyrrhic victory for
Indian tribal sovereignty. Part IV defends the premise that federal Indian law and
its interpretation and application in courts of the United States is an irremediably
evil legal system utterly inconsistent with contemporary understandings of the
natural right to self-determination. Part V propounds an alternative legal theory,
rooted in natural law and partly reflected in the international indigenous rights
regime, that substantiates the right of Indian tribes to a quantum of self-
determination incompatible with continued political association with the United
States. Part VI elaborates and defends an American Indian Declaration of
Independence as the legitimate expression of the natural legal right of Indian
peoples to self-determination and as a rejoinder to Lara and the philosophical and
historical foundation upon which it rests. Finally, Part VII examines and rejects
alternate proposals for the realization of Indian self-determination that stop short
of secession.
II. PROLEGOMENON: TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND
ITS DESTRUCTION BY FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Indian tribes are independent, sovereign nations whose inherent right to self-
determine predates and survives contact with Euro-American peoples.
Notwithstanding the Ibero-Catholic presumption that the indigenous people17 of
16. See infra pp. 100-08 (defining "evil legal system" and presenting a claim that federal Indian law
is such a system).
17. Indigenous peoples are "descen[dants of] the populations which inhabited [a] country ... at the
time of conquest or colonisation." Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples, supra n. 15, at art.
[Vol. 40:71
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the Western Hemisphere were a distinctly inferior and barbarous species"'
salvageable only through forcible conversion to Christianity or death, 9 and
despite the subsequent genocide Spain inflicted upon the original population of
the Americas, all of the European colonial powers, including Spain after 1556,20
recognized the formal sovereignty of the Indian nations of the New World as
1.1.b. The 300 million indigenous peoples are almost always numerical minorities in their states of
residence, and they almost invariably lack access to political and economic power. Dean B. Suagee,
Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the Solar Age, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 671,
679-80 (1992); but see Craig Mauro, Indians Gain Voice in Bolivia, Indianapolis Star A19 (Aug. 15,
2002) (reporting that indigenous peoples-60% of the Bolivian population-now control 25% of the
seats in the Congress of that nation). Although they now "find themselves engulfed by settler
societies," indigenous peoples have embedded ancestral roots "much more deeply than the ... more
powerful sectors of society living on the same lands." S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in
International Law 3 (Oxford U. Press 1996); W. Michael Reisman, Student Author, Protecting
Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 Am. J. Intl. L. 350, 350 (1995) ("'[I]ndigenous
peoples'.. . resisted ... assimilation and survived with a distinct.., cultural identity.").
18. See Strickland, supra n. 12, at 124 (noting that sixteenth-century Spanish ecclesiastics and
academics viewed Indians as "savage" and spent "considerable time ... debating the question: Are
Indians really people?").
19. See Bull "Inter caetera Divinae" of Pope Alexander VI, in Church and State through the
Centuries: A Collection of Historic Documents with Commentaries 153, 155-56 (Sidney Z. Ehler & John
B. Morrall eds. & trans., Biblo & Tannen 1967) (describing the grant of papal authority to
conquistadores to introduce Christianity into the Americas in order to salvage the souls of the
indigenous peoples). The Requerimiento, read from the bow of Spanish-chartered vessels immediately
prior to the commencement of hostilities against the Indians of the New World, offered, in a language
incomprehensible to its targets, the choice of the cross or the sword:
[W]e ask and require that you consider what we have said to you, ...and that you
acknowledge the Church as the ruler and superior of the whole world, and the high priest
called Pope, and in his name the king and queen Dofia Juana our lords, in his place, as
superiors and lords and kings of these islands and this mainland..., and that you consent
and permit that these religious fathers declare and preach to you the aforesaid.
But if you do not do this..., I certify to you that with the help of God we shall forcefully
enter into your country and shall make war against you. . ., and shall subject you to the yoke
and obedience of the Church and of their highnesses; we shall take you and your wives and
your children and shall make slaves of them...; and we shall take away your goods and shall
do to you all the harm and damage that we can,...; and we protest that the deaths and losses
which shall accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their highnesses, or ours, or of
these soldiers who come with us.
The Spanish Tradition in America 59-60 (Charles Gibson ed., U. S.C. Press 1968).
In addition to the Requerimiento, the Laws of Burgos "explicitly denied" Indian nations in the
Americas "all rights to self-determination." Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance
Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 64 (1983).
20. Protestations of Spanish legal academics against the unlawfulness and barbarity of Spanish
treatment of Indians in the Americas led to the abolition of the Requerimiento in 1556. See Robert F.
Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present
125 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1978) (attributing abandonment of the Requerimiento to the labors of
Vitoria and other Dominican scholars); Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli Reflectiones 125-
28 (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (criticizing Spanish use of
Papal bulls to legitimize genocide and land expropriation as violations of international law and
defending the rights of Indian nations to their entitlements); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American
Indian in Western Legal Thought 86 (Oxford U. Press 1990) (quoting Antonio de Montesinos's protest
against barbarous treatment of indigenous peoples in Hispaniola in early sixteenth century: "Are these
not men? Have they not rational souls? Are you not bound to love them as you love yourselves?"
(internal citation omitted)). For a discussion of the tension between Spanish military policy and
existing international law, see generally Williams, supra n. 19. For a more general discussion of the
conflict between positivism and naturalism in international law, see infra pp. 108-12.
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separate and distinct peoples with whom relations were governed by international,
rather than domestic, law.21 For at least three centuries subsequent to the first
contact between Indian nations and Europeans in 1492, international law
recognized a normative order independent of and higher than the decisions of
temporal authority and withheld the imprimatur of law from acts of earthly
sovereigns that violated a universal moral code.22 Under international law, the
territory and sovereignty of nations were sacrosanct, 23 and self-defense, arbitrary
refusal to engage in trade, and exclusion of Christian missionaries constituted the
only lawful grounds for the use of force in contravention of Indian sovereignty.24
Throughout the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, European powers, with the
notable exception of Spain, honored the formal sovereignty of Indian nations as a
general rule,25 and international legal philosophers were openly critical of Spanish
conquest in the New World.26
The conception of Indian nations as sovereign was not merely a European
reserve or an academic theory: indeed, the founders of the United States,
successor state to Great Britain, directly incorporated the international legal
conception of Indian peoples as juridically distinct and prior sovereigns in their
27
constitution, and during its first several decades of existence the fledgling United
States respected Indian rights to sovereignty and property consistent with its
21. See Rupert Costo & Jeannette Henry, Indian Treaties: Two Centuries of Dishonor 6 (Indian
Historian Press 1977) (citing decision of British Royal Commission of 1763 to this effect); Francis Paul
Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-
1834, at 141 (U. Neb. Press 1970) (quoting Thomas Jefferson: "[T]he Indians [have] the full, undivided
and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and.., this might be forever." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28, 44
n. 34 (1947) (noting consistent state practice regarding recognition of Indian sovereignty).
22. See John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 1, 52-53 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., Oxford U. Press
2002) (describing international law as of the sixteenth century as a natural legal system that emerged
from the dissolution of.unitary Christendom); Oliver Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society
vol. 1, at 36 (Ernest Barker trans., 1934) (describing the international system of 1500-1800 as a
universal commonwealth of independent states whose international relations were governed by a
natural law of nations); Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the
Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 Eur. J. Intl. L. 269 (2001) (defining and distinguishing positivism from
natural law in the development of international law). For a discussion of the distinction between
naturalism and positivism, see infra pp. 97-99.
23. Anaya, supra n. 17, at 15.
24. See generally Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis vol. 2 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana
Publications 1964) (elaborating sixteenth-century international just war theory generally and as applied
to the New World); Vitoria, supra n. 20, at 151-52 (limiting legal justifications for war against Indians
to their refusal to permit travel, commerce, or religious proselytizing).
25. See Anaya, supra n. 17, at 10.
26. See e.g. Bartolom6 de las Casas, History of the Indies (Andrre Collard ed. & trans., Harper &
Row 1971) (describing failed clerical efforts to protect indigenous peoples by invocation of natural
legal theories); Vitoria, supra n. 20, at' 125-28, 151, 156 (contending that Indian nations possessed
natural legal rights identical to those possessed by European nations and that the papal grant to Spain
of Indian title was without legal foundation).
27. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting to Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). The differentiation of
Indian nations from the states is understood to constitute a recognition of Indian sovereignty that is
prior to and independent of the United States. See Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood
Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty 261-64 (U. Cal. Press 1980) (describing the
"Indian Commerce Clause" as U.S. recognition of Indian sovereignty).
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international and domestic legal obligations2 Moreover, well into the nineteenth
century, the United States continued to regard Indian sovereignty as a
jurisprudential fact, and alliances, trade agreements, and land cessions were
accomplished by treaties29  after peaceful negotiations between mutual
sovereigns. 3°
Respect for mutual sovereignty, however, collapsed under the weight of
white land hunger and burgeoning U.S. military capacity. Although prudence
restrained U.S. aggression in the early decades of the republic,31 by the nineteenth
century a majority of the U.S. population regarded the presumption of Indian
sovereignty under international and domestic law as an obstacle to white notions
of progress. It fell to federal Indian law to legitimate the violent expropriation of
Indian lands and the destruction of rival polities within what would become the
boundaries of the United States.
A. Destruction of Powers of External Sovereignty
. ., 32
In the 1823 case Johnson v. M'Intosh , Chief Justice John Marshall
domesticated emerging positivist international jurisprudence rejecting the formal
28. See Statement of U.S. Att. Gen. William Wert, Apr. 26, 1821 ("So long as a tribe exists and
remains in possession of its lands, its title and possession are sovereign and exclusive.... [We] have no
more right to enter upon their territory than we have to enter upon the territory of a foreign prince."
(quoted in Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands,
Resources, and People, 23 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 379, 383 (1998)). Although early federal jurisprudence
limited the capacity of Indian tribes to conduct independent foreign policies with other Western states,
the United States otherwise regarded Indian nations as "distinct, independent political communities,..
• admit[ting] their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties ... [like] the other
nations of the earth." Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 559-60 (1832).
29. The United States-Indian treaties of the post-Revolutionary period, though they ceded Indian
land in exchange for U.S. promises, were acts not of tribal surrender but negotiated contracts,
governed by international law, in which Indian tribes reserved those rights not clearly granted to the
United States and acquired other rights and privileges from the United States. Philip P. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 402 (1993).
30. For at least the first three centuries post-contact, prudence directed Euro-American states,
whose foothold in the Americas remained tenuous, to formally recognize militarily potent Indian tribes
as independent sovereigns. Even as of the late eighteenth century, U.S. policy with regard to land
acquisition from Indian tribes was motivated by a desire for peaceful relations and predicated upon
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. See Bradford, supra n. 7, at 26 n. 116 ("The
principle of the Indian right to the lands they possess being thus conceded, the dignity and the interest
of the nation will be advanced by making it the basis of the future administration of justice toward the
Indian tribes." (quoting Report of Secretary of War Henry Knox on the Northwestern Indians, (June 8,
1789)); see also 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000) ("Trade and Intercourse Act") (precluding acquisition of Indian
land except for by cession via a United States-Indian treaty); Prucha, supra n. 21, at 142-43 ("Treating
with the Indians . . . gave foundation and strength to the doctrine that the Indian tribes were
independent nations with their own rights and sovereignty .... "). In those rare eighteenth-century
instances of military hostilities initiated by the United States to annex Indian land, most campaigns
resulted in stalemate or decisive Indian victory. Robert T. Coulter & Steven M. Tullberg, Indian Land
Rights, in The Aggressions of Civilization: Federal Indian Policy since the 1880s, at 193-94 (Sandra L.
Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., Temple U. Press 1984) [hereinafter Aggressions of Civilization].
By 1871, the putative end of treaty making, the United States had entered into as many as 800 treaties
with Indian nations. Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing Self-
Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 65, 66 n. 4 (1992).
31. See Coulter & Tullberg, supra n. 30, at 190-91 (noting European "conquerors" of militarily
superior Indian tribes would have been handily defeated prior to the mid-nineteenth century).
32. 21 U.S. 543.
7
Bradford: Another Such Victory and We Are Undone: A Call to an American Ind
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:71
equality of peoples. 3 Although he acknowledged the "impossibility of undoing
past events and the fact that the sovereign he represented was born in sin, 34 and
although he recognized that tribes were as yet independent polities in retention of
original rights to property and self-governance, Marshall accepted the extravagant
premise that European discovery-not Indian occupancy-constituted ultimate
title to lands in the United States when perfected by conquest.35 While Marshall
admitted that this argument was "opposed to natural right '36 and contrary to
principles of justice, he drew from the doctrine of stare decisis, comparisons to the
practice of other states, and the presumption of Indian "inferiority 3 7 to find that
33. In the mid-seventeenth century, international law began to gradually morph away from its
earlier naturalistic and ecclesiastical foundations and into a Western, state-centric instrument justifying
European colonialism. See Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law:
Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
Oceana Publications 1964). By the eighteenth century indigenous peoples were often regarded by
jurists as ineligible for statehood by virtue of their failure to exhibit attributes of Western civilization in
property relations and trade, and state practice increasingly placed them beyond the pale of the
protective premises of the positivist law of nations, such as mutual respect for sovereignty and
nonintervention. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise §§ 134-135 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed.,
3d ed., 1920). By the nineteenth century, states, freed from external scrutiny, generally denied
indigenous peoples status as subjects of international law and instead treated them according to
domestic law and policy. Anaya, supra n. 17, at 19-20, 131.
34. Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian
Land Claims, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 481,489 (1994).
35. The international legal fiction of "discovery" bestowed occupancy and exclusive negotiating
rights to impair the title of a "discovered" Indian nation upon a so-called discovering European nation.
Although Europeans initially affirmed the collective rights of indigenous peoples, once European
military superiority was established state sovereignty trumped claims to collective rights, and
indigenous peoples were relegated to the status of minorities devoid of legal personality and entitled to
protection only as individuals within states. Anaya, supra n. 17, at 22. By fiat, discovery permitted
European colonial powers to construct mutually exclusive and distinct spheres of influence and thereby
prevent internecine conflicts. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572-73:
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to
appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire . . . [I]t was
necessary, in order to avoid . . . war . .. , to establish a principle, which all should
acknowledge as the law by which the right of acquisition ... should be regulated .... This
principle was, that discovery gave title to the government ... by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.
Although the discovery doctrine affected Indian title only via allocation of spheres of influence, it
provided colonial nations bufficient time and space to survey, claim, and defend footholds in what
became the United States. See id. at 574:
[T]he original inhabitants... were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it . . .; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished . . . by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. While the
different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the
ultimate dominion to be in themselves;.., subject only to the Indian right of occupancy.
See also id. at 588-89 (noting that while the denial of good title to original Indian occupants was unjust,
"[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and
speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been
successfully asserted").
36. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 591-92.
37. See id. at 573 ("[T]he character and religion of [Indians] afforded an apology for considering
them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. The potentates
of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to
8
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"if [such arguments] be indispensable to that system under which the [United
States] has been settled, [they] . . .certainly cannot be rejected by Courts."3
Although the progressive Marshall intended to impose legal limits on the future
conduct of those less charitably disposed toward Indians than he,39 M'Intosh
fueled subsequent claims that "Indians were conquered as soon as John Cabot set
foot on American soil" and that "tribal property rights are not.., rights at all, but
merely. . . 'permission by the whites to occupy.' 4
Still, although in M'Intosh Marshall divested Indian nations of the external
powers to form alliances with or grant land to a power other than the European
discoverer or its successor, and despite his resort to a theory of "heathen
subjugation, 41 to effect this divestment, he left undisturbed the internal powers of
sovereignty they had exercised since time immemorial. However, subsequent
cases provided the occasion to further diminish tribal sovereignty.
B. Imposition of Dependent Status
In the 1831 case Cherokee Nation v. Georgia," Marshall determined that,
despite their retention of reserved rights to occupy their lands subject only to
voluntary cession or conquest 43 and their irrefutable status as distinct political
communities," Indian tribes were, in no small measure by virtue of their imperfect
land tenure judicially imposed in M'Intosh, mere "domestic dependent nations"
under U.S. "pupilage, 45 not sovereign foreign nations or states within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. As a result, the Court
could not exercise original jurisdiction over a case wherein the Cherokees sought
to enjoin enforcement of Georgia law on land guaranteed by treaties.46 Although
Marshall held that the United States owed a common law trust duty to its Indian
the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for
unlimited independence.").
38. Id. at 591-92.
39. See id. at 596-97 ("The peculiar situation of the Indians ... too powerful and brave not to be
dreaded as formidable enemies, required, that means should be adopted for the preservation of peace;
and that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property. This was to be
effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites .... ); see also id. at 574 (making clear that in
the absence of conquest, Indian title can only be lawfully acquired by the United States through a
consensual transfer, as Indians were the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it").
40. Singer, supra n. 34, at 489-90 (noting citation of conquest theories derived from M'Intosh for
proposition that Congress has unlimited authority over Indians in cases such as Tee-Hit- Ton Indians v.
U.S., 348 U.S. 272 (1955)).
41. Porter, supra n. 8, at 912 (coining the term).
42. 30 U.S. 1.
43. Id. at 17 ("Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable ...right to the lands they
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession" or by conquest).
44. See id. at 16 (noting that a majority of the justices agreed that the Cherokee Nation was "a
distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing
itself").
45. See id. at 17 ("[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great
father.").
46. Id. at 15-18 (citing U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2).
2004]
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"wards," he conceded that such a duty was judicially unenforceable, 47 and an
examination of other justices' opinions, construing the United States-Cherokee
relationship as that between a conqueror and a subject people,48 hinted that the
"trust doctrine," true to its roots in cultural racism and xenophobia, 49 would
become yet another legal tool with which to diminish Indian sovereignty. °
47. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 ("If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not
the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and
that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent
the future."). As of 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court has never granted relief for a breach of duty arising
under the trust doctrine as defined at common law: congressional authority over Indians need only "be
tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians." Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). Moreover, relief is available only in those limited circumstances
where the United States acts in the narrow and specific role of private, rather than public, trustee. See
Nev. v. U.S., 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983). In short, the trust is a moral, but not a legal, duty. See Reid
Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 Stan. L. Rev.
1213, 1223-30 (1975) (undertaking historical analysis of judicial enforcement of the trust as applied to
Congress).
48. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 23-24 (Johnson, J., concurring) (stating that Indian nations are
disqualified from consideration as states because they reject adherence to modern Western theories of
social progress and thus lack the requisite degree of "civilization" under international law); id. at 27-28
(describing Indian tribes as "nothing more than wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood
and habit, and having neither laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state"). In a
rather stark dissent, Justice Thompson concluded that the Cherokees were a sovereign nation
inasmuch as they constituted a "body of men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and
advantage by means of their union" and that any such state which governs itself is sovereign, regardless
of the nature of its alliances with other, more powerful states. Id. at 52-53; see also id. at 53 (holding
further that "a weak state, that, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under the protection of a
more powerful one, without stripping itself of the right of government and sovereignty, does not cease
on this account to be placed among the sovereigns who acknowledge no other power").
49. See Anaya, supra n. 17, at 24 (arguing that the trust doctrine is a form of "scientific racism" that
posits that whites have a duty to "wean native peoples from their 'backward' ways and to 'civilize'
them" (citing Imperialism 1-40 (Philip D. Curtin ed., Walker & Co. 1971)); see also Lesley Karen
Friedman, Native Hawaiians, Self-Determination, and the Inadequacy of the State Land Trusts, 14 U.
Haw. L. Rev. 519, 563-64 ("[T]he federal-tribal trust doctrine . .. explicitly relie[s] upon the
'primitivism' of natives to justify interference in their affairs."); Coulter & Tullberg, supra n. 30, at 200
(critiquing the trust doctrine as the political will of a white population committed to the notion of
Indians as a "semi-barbarous" people who ought to yield to white civilization). In fact, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the conception of the trust as simply the duty to act as "a
Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race." Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S.
517, 525 (1877). The "white man's burden" motivated federal Indian policy well into the twentieth
century. See U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39, 46 (1913) ("Always living in separate and isolated
communities, adhering to primitive modes of life, largely influenced by superstition and fetichism [sic],
and chiefly governed according to the crude customs inherited from their ancestors, [Indians] are
essentially a simple, uninformed and inferior people .... [A]s a superior and civilized nation [the
United States has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders ....").
50. Admittedly, the trust doctrine has broadened over the past two centuries to encompass, at least
in theory, a set of duties greater than those pertaining strictly to guardianship over Indian land and
more expansive than those bargained for in treaties, including the duties to "ensure the survival and
welfare of Indian[s]," to "provide those services required to protect and enhance Indian lands,
resources, and self-government," and to "raise the standard of living and social well-being of the Indian
people." Robert N. Wells, Jr., Native American Resurgence and Renewal: A Reader and Bibliography
19 (Scarecrow Press 1994) (quoting Am. Indian Policy Rev. Commn., Final Report (U.S. Govt. Prtg.
Off. 1977); see also Bradford, supra n. 7, at 62 n. 297 (enumerating legislative programs enacted to
discharge trust obligations). However, political pressure has ensured, predictably, that these
obligations have almost never been discharged in good faith: in a democratic republic, a self-interested
majority represents a powerful barrier to honoring treaty commitments benefiting a discrete minority
not formally an organic part of the body politic yet in possession of vast lands and resources. See John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 135-79 (Harv. U. Press 1980) ("There
will always be a conflict when a government ... must act both as trustee in the best interests of a small
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C. Discovery of Congressional Plenary Power
Having reduced Indian nafions from sovereigns to dependencies with a
stroke of his pen in Worcester v. Georgia,51 Marshall, while retreating somewhat
from his position in Cherokee Nation, opened the floodgates to Indian
52
subordination. Although he concluded that, as a matter of domestic as well as
international law, Indian nations were distinct political and legal communities that
enjoyed full powers of internal sovereignty53 and immunity from the operation of
state laws even in a relationship of dependency upon the United States,5 4 to
support his holding Marshall interpreted the grant to Congress of the power to
regulate commerce with Indian nations-a power denied to the states 5-to afford
Congress "plenary" power, to the exclusion of the states, over Indian affairs.
While subsequent opinions have cited Worcester for the foundational principle of
federal Indian law-that the powers of Indian tribes are "inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished" 56-Marshall's failure to
clearly and precisely define the term "plenary, 57 has allowed an often hostile
Congress to auto-determine its powers relative to Indian nations.58
segment of the populace and also as a servant of the best interests of the entire society."). Even worse,
the rationale for the trust doctrine-that Indians are uncivilized and therefore incompetent to manage
their own affairs-provided the indispensable moral and political basis for the assertion of plenary
power to circumscribe Indian self-determination. See infra at pp. 81-82 (discussing plenary power); see
also Porter, supra n. 8, at 919-20 (arguing that Cherokee Nation "embedded th[e] ideology [of Indian
inferiority that justifies the trust doctrine] firmly within the fabric of the American law dealing with the
Indian nations"). For a contrary view that credits the trust doctrine as "essential to the future cultural
and social survival of the Indian peoples," see Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of
Indian Self-Determination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 369, 371 (2003).
51. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
52. See Porter, supra n. 8, at 919-20 (postulating that Marshall revealed in Worcester that he
believed his conclusions about federal authority over Indian affairs as stated in Cherokee Nation were
overstated, but criticizing Worcester for retreating somewhat from Cherokee Nation "only after he had
established the legal justification for American colonial policies designed to secure wealth, resources,
and opportunity for the emerging nation").
53. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559 ("Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities . . . . The very term 'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a people
distinct from others."'); id. at 548-49 (recognizing that Indian tribes had inherent powers of self-
government predating the Constitution which survived its ratification and observing that the "settled
state of things when the war of our revolution commenced" was that tribes were considered "nations
capable of... governing themselves").
54. See id. at 560-61:
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its
independence-its right to self government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its
protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and
ceasing to be a state .... "Tributary and feudatory states," says Vattel, "do not thereby
cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self government ... [is] left in the
administration of the state."
55. See id. ("The Cherokee nation... is a distinct community.... in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force .... ).
56. U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian
Law 122 (U.S. Govt. Prtg. Off. 1945) (emphasis omitted)).
57. The "plenary power" doctrine, with origins in medieval-era traditions of Christian cultural
racism, was carried into the New World by Columbus, developed by successive European arrivals, and
reified as moral imperative in U.S. jurisprudence to permit the "superior" race to exercise whatever
power necessary to "civilize" indigenous peoples. David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert
11
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Accordingly, in a real sense, Worcester was a battle won and a war lost: by
1900, Congress, with the imprimatur of the Court, had qualified nearly every
aspect of tribal life by legislation,59 and presently Indian nations are subject to the
broadest conception of plenary power pursuant to which their sovereignty "exists
only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. ' 60 By
merely wielding the crushing force of plenary power, Congress may determine
whether an Indian tribe exists, ascertain its membership, and even legislatively
terminate it;61 take tribal lands with only limited obligations to pay
compensation; 62 and "limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-
government which the tribes otherwise possess."63 While Worcester was, on its
face, a victory for Indian sovereignty, the judicial invention of plenary power
provided a mechanism for the destruction of its vision of a separate and legally
protected status-dependent upon the United States but yet still sovereign-for
Indian nations.
A. Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 326 (3d ed., West 1993); see also Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing
the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 219, 265 (arguing plenary power "erase[s] the
difference presented by the Indian in order to sustain . . . European norms and value structures").
Other commentators suggest Marshall's use of the term "plenary" was not meant to denote "absolute"
or "total" power but rather to signify federal, as opposed to state powers, thereby shielding tribal
sovereignty from state legislation. See Rachel San Kronowitz, Joanne Lichtman, Steven Paul McSloy
& Matthew G. Olsen, Student Authors, Toward Consent and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political
Status of Indian Nations, 22 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 507, 525 (1987).
58. The past two centuries of U.S. practice suggest that the term "plenary" as used in Worcester
implies general police powers, as opposed to the limited, delegated powers the federal government
bears in relation to states, and as such arrogates to Congress power to regulate every aspect of Indian
affairs. By the late nineteenth century "plenary power" was accepted as the absolute prerogative of
Congress vis-A-vis the Indian tribes. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (holding
Congress, under its plenary power, could abrogate a treaty when "in the interest of the country and the
Indians themselves"); U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-85 (1886) (holding Congress has
incontrovertible right to exercise authority over Indians for their own well-being). The judicial branch
has adopted Congress's definition. See e.g. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)
("Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government
which the tribes otherwise possess."); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 ("The sovereignty that the Indian tribes
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to
complete defeasance."). As of 2004, no congressional exercise of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian
affairs has ever been set aside by the courts, with the exception of Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718
(1987), which declared specific statutory escheat provisions a taking as applied to Indian land and thus
constitutionally invalid under the Fifth Amendment. For a discussion of the evolution of plenary
power from an inhibition on the power of states to a general writ to intervene in Indian self-
government, see Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 212-36 (1984).
59. See American Indian Policy: Self-Governance and Economic Development 38 (Lyman H.
Legters & Fremont J. Lyden eds., Greenwood Press 1994) (noting that subsequent to Kagama,
Congress has passed more than 5,000 laws regulating Indians).
60. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
61. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46-47; Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 306-08 (1902)
[hereinafter Hitchcock].
62. See U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980) (recognizing congressional plenary
power over Indian nations in relation to property law).
63. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
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D. Congressional Plenary Power Unleashed
It did not take long for Congress to design a legal regime, built around the
assertion of its plenary power, that would eradicate tribal sovereignty. The 1883
case of Ex parte Crow Dog,64 in which the U.S. Supreme Court overturned, for
lack of jurisdiction, the federal conviction of an Indian charged with the murder of
another Indian, provided the catalyst. Determined to rectify the barbarous,
savage quality of tribal law and mollify public fervor, Congress applied "white
man's morality '65 with the Major Crimes Act of 1885 ("MCA") 66 to expressly
establish concurrent federal jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians-
on reservations regardless of the membership status of their victims.
67
Unsuccessful legal challenges to the MCA, predicated upon claims to inherent
Indian sovereignty at least insofar internal relations were concerned, simply
provided the judiciary occasion to undergird the trust doctrine and plenary power
and to sanction further incursions against Worcester.68
64. 109 U.S. 556. Spotted Tail, an authoritarian Brule Sioux chief who had staked his political
fortunes on accommodation with U.S. authorities, was shot and killed on the reservation by his
political rival, Crow Dog. After a peacemaking ceremony, the family of Spotted Tail agreed to accept
a payment from Crow Dog of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to resolve the dispute. See Sidney L.
Harring, Crow Dog's Case: A Chapter in the Legal History of Tribal Sovereignty, 14 Am. Indian L. Rev.
191, 198-99 (1989). Despite the satisfaction of the entire Brule tribe, the case presented federal
authorities the pretext for extension of federal criminal law to Indians. Id. at 200-01. Crow Dog was
arrested, tried in the Territorial Court of South Dakota, and sentenced to hang by an all-white jury. Id.
at 204-12. However, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, albeit with reference to Indian
"savagery," finding that the Brule had the sovereign right to resolve, free from U.S. interference,
disputes wholly internal to the tribe. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567-68, 571 (refusing to extend U.S.
criminal law to acts occurring on Indian reservations on the ground that to do so would "measure[] the
red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality"). Nonetheless, for a white majority
Crow Dog was a "legal atrocity" inasmuch as an Indian killer had "escaped punishment." Harring,
supra at 191, 194.
65. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571. As Rep. Cutcheon (D-Mich.) stated before the Indian Affairs
Committee in 1884:
[A]n Indian, when he commits a crime, should be recognized as a criminal, and so treated
under the laws of the land. I do not believe we shall ever succeed in civilizing the Indian
race until we teach them regard for law, and show them that they are not only responsible to
the law, but amenable to its penalties.
It is an infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should be anywhere
within its boundaries a body of people who can, with absolute impunity, commit the crime of
murder ....
16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885).
66. 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
67. The MCA in its current version subjects Indians charged with 14 serious felonies to exclusive
federal criminal jurisdiction regardless of the place of the alleged offense or the identity of the victim.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
68. See e.g. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375. In fairness, it should be noted that federal judicial review of the
exercise of Indian legal sovereignty has not been exclusively jurispathic: in 1896 the Court concluded,
upon the basis of historical evidence that tribal criminal jurisdiction predated the United States, that
tribal powers are not derivative of federal law because they predated the Constitution and
consequently the Cherokee Nation did not have to use federal constitutional processes, such as the
grand jury, in prosecutions. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). However, the worst was yet to
come. See infra.
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E. Judicial Power Grab: The Implicit Divestiture Doctrine
Even after a century and a half of congressional assertions of plenary power,
however, the internal legal sovereignty of Indian nations remained largely intact.
Indeed, the 1978 case of United States v. Wheeler,69 in which the Court determined
that the Double Jeopardy Clause70 did not bar a federal prosecution of a Navajo
tribal member subsequent to a Navajo tribal prosecution for the same offense on
the ground that the exercise of tribal jurisdiction was "part of the Navajos'
primeval sovereignty, '71 and not delegated authority, reinforced the separate
sovereignty of Indian nations at least with regard to their own memberships.72
However, just as in Worcester, this legal victory for Indian sovereignty carried
within it the seed of future defeats: in affirming Indian sovereignty, the Wheeler
Court reminded all concerned that "existing sovereign powers" survived only
"until Congress acts," and that in future cases Indian nations would be presumed
to possess only those aspects of sovereignty "not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status., 73 This judicially
crafted "implicit divestiture" doctrine thereby cleared the road to the judicial
discovery of powers inconsistent with the status of Indian tribes as domestic
dependencies and thus to the ultimate destruction of Indian legal sovereignty.74
F. Judicial Negation of Indian Sovereignty
Implicit divestiture was quickly put to use. In the 1978 case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,75 the Court held that Indian nations had lost their
inherent power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian land
due to their alleged "submi[ssion] to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States.,76 In rationalizing the application of the implicit divestiture doctrine to a
power recognized by treaties,77 the Court, intimating that Indians were
insufficiently civilized to be trusted with the freedom and property of non-Indians,
explained that exercise of tribal jurisdiction would imperil the personal liberty of
non-Indian U.S. citizens who would be hauled into the alien legal systems of the
tribes, denied due process and the protections of the Bill of Rights, and subjected
69. 435 U.S. 313.
70. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution prohibits any person being "subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2.
71. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328.
72. Id. at 332.
73. Id. at 323.
74. For a detailed examination of the implicit divestiture doctrine, see N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit
Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 353 (1994).
75. 435 U.S. 191.
76. Id. at 210.
77. Read broadly, Oliphant could be understood to terminate all powers of Indian sovereignty
"inconsistent with their status" as domestic dependencies. Id. at 208 (describing Indian nations as
retaining "elements of quasi-sovereign authority" yet holding that the tribes are "prohibited from
exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and
those powers inconsistent with their status" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
[Vol. 40:71
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to "unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."78 Because failure to find
implicit divestiture would permit savages "separated by race [and] tradition" 79 to
subject non-Indians to their laws, the Court reversed the presumption that Indian
sovereignty survives unless and until expressly revoked by Congress. With
Oliphant, judicial review, rather than congressional assertion of plenary power,
became the mechanism of choice for the destruction of Indian sovereignty. 8°
In 1981 the Court expanded the reversal of the long-established presumption
in favor of inherent Indian sovereignty in Montana v. United States,8 holding that
tribes generally have no civil jurisdiction over non-members on non-member
owned land within reservations 2 on the ground that Indian sovereignty does not
extend "beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations, 83 and that exercise of tribal powers beyond these limits, in the
absence of express congressional delegation, is "inconsistent with the dependent
78. Id. at 210. Empirical evidence suggests that racism, rather than sound social science, is the
father of this presumption and that comparisons between tribal and U.S. courts reveal many
similarities. See e.g. Kalt & Singer, supra n. 14, at 20 (contending that "it has not been demonstrated
that all or even many tribes are judicially unfair or otherwise disrespectful of the rights of those who
appear before them"); Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the
Methods of Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 77, 103-05
(2004) (reviewing voluminous evidence and concluding that tribal courts "have produced many legal
institutions with systems of law that sometimes share and sometimes diverge from state and federal
practices"). Moreover, only a few years subsequent to Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist adopted a contrary
position in regard to non-Indian legal systems. In his words:
[I]t is wholly inaccurate to say that a government or a society ought to be measured
primarily by the way in which it accords due process of law to its criminal defendants. This is
undoubtedly a very important measure; but equally important is the extent to which a
society succeeds in vindicating the moral judgments of its members as they are embodied in
its criminal laws.
William H. Rehnquist, Isaac Parker, Bill Sikes and the Rule of Law, 6 UALR L.J. 485, 499 (1983).
Further evidence that judicial anxiety over tribal jurisprudence is the product of racism is the
fact that similar concerns are not expressed in the subjection of Indians to the judgments of non-
Indians, and to non-Indian norms, in state courts and in federal courts exercising MCA jurisdiction.
See Kalt & Singer, supra n. 14, at 19 (stating that while "[iut is possible that tribal courts may be unfair
to nonmembers[,] . . . it is also true that state courts may be unfair to tribal members, especially in
states where state court judges are elected and subject to political pressure to limit tribes' jurisdiction
and property rights").
79. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (citing Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).
80. Legislation, known colloquially as the Duro fix, purports to reverse Oliphant and restore to
Indian nations their inherent sovereignty over non-member Indians. Indian Civil Rights Act
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990), Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §1301(2) (2000)). However, the Duro fix failed to resolve the question of
whether the grant of power to the tribes to try non-member Indians had simply effected the restoration
of a constituent of their inherent sovereignty, thus rendering tribal prosecutions the acts of sovereigns
independent of the United States, or whether the power had been delegated through the Act, thereby
effectively converting tribal prosecutions of non-member Indians into federal prosecutions, and
commentators predicted the very question presented in Lara. See e.g. Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent
Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 109, 112 (1992) (querying whether the
Duro fix delegated power to the tribes or restored power and predicting future litigation over the
question).
81. 450 U.S. 544.
82. Id. at 565-66.
83. Id. at 564. See also id. at 566 (holding that a "tribe ... retain[s] inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe").
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status of the tribes." 84  Subsequent cases reformulated and reinterpreted the
implicit divestiture doctrine to further constrain tribal powers, holding that Indian
nations are implicitly divested of sovereignty, despite the need to assert authority
to protect or enable tribal self-government, in issue areas where there is merely a
"lack of a tradition of self-government,"8 5 or where the exercise of tribal
sovereignty can be characterized as "inconsistent with the overriding interests of
the National Government." 6
In 1990 the Court extended Oliphant and the implicit divestiture doctrine to
impose still greater limitations on Indian legal sovereignty, holding in Duro v.
Reina that the absence of tribal jurisdiction over the criminal acts of non-
member Indians applies equally to all non-members. 88 Although the Duro Court
accepted in principle that Indian nations were "a good deal more than private
voluntary organizations," it stressed that post-Oliphant, tribes could no longer be
described as fully sovereign within their own territory89 and that to ascertain the
quantum of residual sovereignty possessed by any given tribe required a
determination of whether the powers in question were "needed to control [the
tribe's] own internal relations, and to preserve [its] own unique customs and social
order."9  The argument that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-
members was a primary concomitant of internal self-government and thus not
implicitly divested fell victim to the Oliphant presumption of the savagery of
Indians and their legal systems. Because "[c]riminal trial and punishment is so
serious an intrusion on personal liberty," and because Indian legal systems are
"influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they
serve," 91 Indian tribes could not be trusted to be civilized in the prosecution of
non-Indians. Consequently, the Duro Court concluded that criminal jurisdiction
over non-members was "necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission
to the overriding sovereignty of the United States. '92
Over the past decade, a hostile Supreme Court has capitalized upon
congressional apathy and decided a series of civil cases that have drained the
concept of Indian legal sovereignty enunciated in Worcester of almost all meaning
while amplifying the presumption in favor of Indian cultural inferiority. Two in
particular bear specific mention.
84. Id. at 564.
85. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 731 (1983).
86. Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980).
87. 495 U.S. 676.
88. Id. at 688.
89. Id. at 688 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 685-86.
91. Id. at 693.
92. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693. Curiously, although the Duro Court refused to "adopt a view of tribal
sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by political
bodies that do not include them," it found no need to impose similar restrictions on the prosecution of
Indians under the MCA by political bodies-i.e., the United States-that do not grant them full and
equal citizenship. Id.
[Vol. 40:71
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The first, Strate v. A-1 Contractors93 grafted the Indian savagery trope onto
an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the Oliphant/Montana implicit divestiture
formulation to hold that tribes lack the power to govern the conduct of non-
member tortfeasors, even for the protection of their members, because to subject
them to the "alien" and unfamiliar (read: "savage") legal systems of the tribes
cannot reasonably be regarded as either consent-based jurisdiction or as essential
to protect the "political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare" of the tribe or to "control internal relations." 94
The second, Nevada v. Hicks,95 carried forward the Indian savagery theme
and gutted the Montana presumption in favor of Indian civil jurisdiction over non-
members on tribal lands, holding that state officials are immune from tribal
jurisdiction even when they tortiously enter tribal land. 96 The majority, committed
to the notion that Indian courts are so different from other American courts in
regard to their structure, substantive law, and degree of judicial independence that
it would be fundamentally unfair to subject non-members to their jurisdiction,97
concluded that neither Montana exception-consensual conduct by non-members
or the protection of tribal government-applied to the facts, as the purpose of the
non-member conduct had not been commercial and "the issue [was] whether the
Tribes' law will apply, not to their own members, but to a narrow category of
outsiders."9" In short, the Hicks Court erected a presumption, contrary to
Montana, against inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members, regardless of
the status of the land,99 thereby withdrawing the last vestige of Indian territorial
sovereignty over non-members.
G. Judicial Derogation of Indian Sovereignty: An Explanatory and Predictive
Heuristic
Several scholars explain the rapid post-Oliphant mobilization of the judiciary
against Indian sovereignty as a reaction to the proliferation of "economic success
stories in Indian country" sparked by three-plus decades of support from the
political branches for Indian self-determination.' °° In Indian country,' °' economic
93. 520 U.S. 438, 456-59 (1997).
94. Id. at 458-59 (citing the Montana exceptions to the presumption in favor of application of the
implicit divestiture doctrine). Subsequent case law of the circuit courts, interpreting Strate, has
bolstered the narrow interpretation of the powers tribes require to protect their powers of self-
government. See e.g. Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Hoopa Valley Tribe lacks authority to regulate timber harvesting on non-Indian owned land within the
reservation inside a "buffer zone" designated by the tribe as necessary for preservation of a protected
cultural site); Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Crow
Tribe did not have jurisdiction to tax an electric company on the value of its utility right of way through
the reservation).
95. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 383-84.
98. Id. at 371.
99. Id. at 375-76 (Souter, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
100. In 1970 Congress delegated authority to the Secretaries of the Interior and Health, Education,
and Welfare to enter contracts with Indian tribes in which federal Indian programs would continue to
be funded by the United States but responsibility for planning and administration would be assumed
20041
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success bred from the implementation of Indian self-determination policies
promotes increased political activism and more aggressive assertions of
sovereignty' 2 and draws tribes into greater contact, and conflict, with non-
member individuals, corporations, and governments. 13  According to this
explanation, despite-or, perhaps, because of-the public commitment of the
political branches to Indian sovereignty and the unwillingness of either to pay the
direct costs associated with a retreat from that position, the judiciary has
backstopped Congress and the executive and assumed responsibility for
preventing the emergence of Indian tribes as competitors within, and regulators
of, markets. 1°4
However, this theory, while positing a coherent explanation for the
development of the implicit divestiture doctrine to strip civil jurisdiction away
from Indian tribes, does not account for the withdrawal of criminal jurisdiction, let
alone for the active suppression of Indian ethnodevelopment'05 and religious
expression, 1°6 activities arguably wholly internal to the tribes and vital to the
by tribal governments. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C §§
450-458 (2000). Support for Indian self-determination took on a bipartisan tint in the early 1980s. See
President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches
/1983/12483b.htm (Jan. 24, 1983) ("Our policy is to reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes on a
government-to-government basis .... "). Congress in turn authorized development of enhanced self-
governance plans under the rubric of a "New Federalism" advanced by the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (allowing tribes to assume administration of some Bureau of Indian
Affairs programs). Since the 1980s both major political parties have encouraged tribes to enter the
world of private enterprise, and federal agencies have been encouraged to initiate extensive leasing
and exploitation of tribal resources and to develop programs to lure non-Indian businesses to
reservations by offering tax advantages, regulatory relief, preferential contracting, and technical
assistance. Wells, supra n. 50, at 9. Official support for Indian self-determination remains U.S. policy.
101. "Indian country" is a legal term of art referring to, essentially, all lands within the limits of
Indian reservations, dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States, and
parcels allotted to Indian individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
102. See generally Terry L. Anderson, Sovereign Nations or Reservations?: An Economic History of
American Indians (P. Research Inst. Pub. Policy 1995) (describing correlations between tribal
economic development and the subsequent development and assertion of political sovereignty); John
C. Mohawk, Indian Economic Development: An Evolving Concept of Sovereignty, 39 Buff. L. Rev. 495,
499 (1991) ("Indian economic development may be less about creating wealth than it is about creating
the conditions for political power ... ").
103. See Kalt & Singer, supra n. 14, at 2-3 ("Despite-or, perhaps, because of-the economic, social
and political success of Native self-rule, tribal sovereignty is now under increasingly vigorous and
effective attack.").
104. For a more detailed exposition of the theory that links U.S. withdrawal of support for Indian
self-determination to development of tribal economic competition, see Braveman, supra n. 11, at 109-
13.
105. See San Jose Declaration, UNESCO, UNESCO Doc. FS 82/WF.32 (1982) (defining
"ethnodevelopment" as autonomous economic activity comporting with religious and cultural
requirements of equitability and intergenerational responsibility).
106. See e.g. Empl. Div., Or. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990)
(refusing to apply the compelling state interest test developed under the First Amendment to an
Oregon prohibition on the use of peyote applied to religious practice by members of the Native
American Church on the grounds that it would be "courting anarchy" to "open the prospect of
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind"
and that "leaving accommodation to the political process" is the appropriate means to determine the
state interest in regulating Indian religion); Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S.
439, 451 (1988) (upholding U.S. logging and construction activities on national forest lands used for
religious purposes by several tribes, even while conceding it was undisputed that the activities could
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promotion and protection of tribal self-determination. 10 7 Recognition of the
sovereign power of an Indian tribe to prosecute non-members who are not Indian,
or to engage in traditional worship, would not seem to yield substantial economic
effects.
Several scholars explain the judicial approach as the shared moral
pronouncement of all three branches of the federal government, hailing back to
M'Intosh and Crow Dog, on the desirability of preserving pockets of normative
divergence within the national borders: if only Indian sovereignty can be disposed
of, Indians will be obligated to assimilate and embrace the trappings of civilization
for their own benefit, as well as for the benefit of those whom they would
otherwise subject to heathen and barbarous judicial customs.' °8 To this end, the
political branches and the judiciary work together adroitly, if unconsciously,
sharing the burdens and the responsibilities of managing Indians, assuming lead
responsibility when it is expedient to do so, and affording each other the necessary
social and political cover to avoid the potential costs associated with popular
recognition that what they are in fact engaged in is a form of neocolonialism. 19
This latter account for judicial activism in derogation of tribal sovereignty, if
correct, offers better insight into the phenomenon observed serially over the
course of the past two centuries-a seeming victory for advocates of tribal
sovereignty is followed by a series of losses inflicted principally by a coordinate
branch. Worcester's holding that tribes possessed the full quantum of internal
have "devastating effects on ... Indian religious practices," on the theory that to find otherwise would
be tantamount to permitting a religious servitude on public lands); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986)
(finding in legislative history and text of a criminal statute extending protection to eagles clear
evidence of congressional intent to exercise plenary power and abrogate treaty-reserved right to hunt
eagles); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting U.S. executive action in support of
Makah petition to International Whaling Commission for an aboriginal subsistence quota of whales
prior to completion of environmental assessment as violating timing requirements of National
Environmental Policy Act and enjoining the Makah from practicing their treaty-reserved right to
engage in the religious sacrament of hunting whales). For a detailed chronicling of the prohibitions on
traditional forms of Indian religious practice and ethnodevelopment see Allison M. Dussias, Ghost
Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century
Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 773 (1997).
107. The withdrawal of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has seriously undermined public
safety in Indian country. In the absence of state criminal jurisdiction, and the unwillingness of the
federal government to expend the resources to prosecute non-Indians who commit relatively minor or
nuisance crimes on reservations, a jurisdictional gap exists in practice that promotes lawlessness. See
Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument before
the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 13 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Policy 59 (2003) (discussing the
effects of criminal jurisdictional gaps in Indian country).
108. See Braveman, supra n. 11, at 77:
Underlying the Court's approach to inherent tribal sovereignty since Worcester ... is an
implicit understanding of Indian peoples as the "other," as "them" rather than "us." The use
of the them/us construction leads the current Court to its conclusion that inherent tribal
sovereignty should be limited to instances when Indian peoples are behaving in a distinctive
fashion and only to the extent of governing themselves.
109. See e.g. Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture
of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1, 7-8 (1999) (attributing recent judicial
service as "our most enthusiastic colonial agent" to political expedience in the interest of all three
branches rather than to a profound reshuffling of the distribution of powers over Indian affairs in
derogation of congressional plenary power).
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sovereignty fell prey to congressional assertion of plenary power and the passage
of over five thousand federal laws burdening Indian tribes; Crow Dog's defense of
the full panoply of tribal legal sovereignty was brushed aside by the MCA and still
further assertions of plenary power; and congressional inaction in respect to tribal
jurisdiction over non-members, ratified grudgingly by Wheeler, prompted the
Supreme Court to invent the implied divestiture doctrine to take up where
Congress, committed to or at least bound by the principle of Indian self-
determination, had left off. If an interbranch concord to perpetuate
neocolonialism-by-stealth is in fact the best explanation for two centuries of
diminution of Indian sovereignty, United States v. Lara may well read less like a
triumph for Indian self-determination and more like a harbinger of far worse to
come.
0
III. UNITED STATES V. LARA: A PYRRHIC VICTORY
A. Background
When the Eighth and Ninth Circuits split on the question of whether,
subsequent to the Duro fix,"' a tribal prosecution of a non-member Indian rested
upon its own inherent authority rather than upon authority delegated by Congress
in that legislation,"' the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lara to afford
resolution." 3
In Lara, Billy Jo Lara, a non-member Indian, claimed that his prosecution by
the federal government for assault on a police officer, subsequent to a prosecution
by the Spirit Lake Tribe for the same offense, was barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The U.S. Solicitor General, arguing on behalf of tribal inherent authority
contended that (1) the United States and the prosecuting tribe were separate
sovereigns; (2) the dual sovereignty doctrine, which permits separate sovereigns to
110. For a diametrically opposed view of the manner in which the three coordinate branches of the
federal government collaborate in the creation of federal Indian policy and law, and an argument that
the judicial branch "serve[s] as a second institution that is structurally distinct from but potentially able
to sit in judgment of and to impose limits... on another branch's plenary powers," see Resnik, supra n.
78, at 84-86; see also id. at 89-90:
[Tirained in the Marbury presumption of constitutional constraint, judges always ask about,
sometimes wrestle with, and occasionally even impose limitations on government actors
(themselves included) in the name of United States constitutionalism .... For better and worse,
but time and again, jurists doing Federal Indian Law keep trying to assimilate the interaction
between federal power and tribes to American constitutional precepts that, somewhere and
somehow, boundaries exist on the powers claimed by government.
111. Seesupran. 80.
112. See U.S. v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a tribe prosecuting a non-member
Indian exercised federal power); U.S. v. Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that tribes exercising criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians rely upon delegated authority);
compare U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that tribes prosecuting a non-
member exercise inherent authority).
113. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1631 ("We must decide whether Congress has the constitutional power to
relax restrictions that the political branches have, over time, placed on the exercise of a tribe's inherent
legal authority."). Although the Court characterized the restrictions as having been placed on tribal
sovereignty by Congress, the conflict giving rise to the case at bar was not the result of any assertion of
congressional plenary power but rather judicial activism. See supra at pp. 93.
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prosecute an individual for the same offense without offending the Double
Jeopardy Clause, applied to and disposed of the case; (3) the Duro fix was
intended by Congress to restore to tribes the power to prosecute non-member
Indians, and had that effect;114 and (4) the power of tribes to prosecute non-
member Indians was an aspect of their inherent sovereignty!"
5
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for a majority that included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg, Justice Breyer ruled that Congress intended
the Duro fix, in language that "recognize[s] and affirm[s] . . . 'inherent' tribal
power,"' 16 to restore to Indian tribes an aspect of their inherent sovereignty rather
than to delegate to them federal prosecutorial power, a conclusion buttressed
further by the legislative history. 7 Having reached this conclusion, the sole
remaining question for Justice Breyer was whether the Constitution authorized
Congress to have done so-i.e., whether Congress possessed the power under the
Constitution to amend judicially constructed federal common law.
In answering this question in the affirmative, Justice Breyer did not merely
reference plenary power as the source of such authority; rather, he characterized
plenary power as a bundle of "preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in
any Federal Government" that are "necessary concomitants of nationality""' 8 that
authorizes Congress to make "major changes in the metes and bounds of tribal
sovereignty" and even to terminate Indian tribes' legal existence entirely." 9
Moreover, although he took pains to stress that federal Indian law is a
collaborative project in which the political branches create a "backdrop for the
intricate web of judicially made .. .law,"'2° Justice Breyer affirmed that judicial
review of a congressional exercise of plenary power, even where such exercise
overturns judicially crafted law, presents an all but nonjusticiable political
114. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1632 (The Duro fix, "in permitting a tribe to bring certain tribal prosecutions
against nonmember Indians, does not purport to delegate the Federal Government's own federal
power. Rather, it enlarges the tribes' own 'powers of self-government' to include 'the inherent power
of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,'
including nonmembers." (emphasis omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis omitted).
117. Id. at 1633.
118. Id. at 1634 (quoting U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)).
119. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1635 (affirming, in dicta, congressional plenary power to terminate Indian
tribes). According to Justice Breyer, so potent is plenary power that the only limits the Constitution
imposes upon the power of Congress to contract or expand tribal sovereignty are the sovereignty of the
states and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 1635-36.
120. Id. at 1636 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206 (emphasis omitted)).
2004]
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question 12 and disposes of the legal question in favor of the congressional
command. 22
C. Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Stevens
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens joined Justice Breyer in
concluding that the grant of power to Indian tribes effected by the Duro fix was a
restoration of inherent sovereignty: because Congress has the power to authorize
states (sovereigns that postdate Indian tribes) to exercise inherent powers that the
Constitution has withdrawn and reposited in the U.S., Congress must possess at
least as much inherent legislative authority to "relax restrictions on an ancient
inherent tribal power.'
123
2. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy, while concurring in the judgment, challenged the reasoning
of the majority and suggested that the attempt by Congress to remedy Duro had
"extend[ed] [tribal] sovereignty beyond ... historical limits" 124 and subjected Lara,
without his consent, "to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the
Constitution," contrary to the constitutional design.' 2' Quite pointedly, Justice
Kennedy suggested that had the case arisen in a different posture-i.e., if the
federal prosecution had preceded the tribal prosecution and Lara had objected to
tribal court jurisdiction-constitutional questions under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses would have arisen and would likely have precluded the
assertion of tribal jurisdiction and disposed of any Double Jeopardy claim. 26
3. Justice Thomas
With a separate opinion concurring in the judgment that might have been
styled as a dissent, Justice Thomas seized upon the fundamental incompatibility
between the plenary power doctrine and the concept of Indian sovereignty to call
the latter into doubt. Plenary power and Indian sovereignty, in his view, are
mutually exclusive:
To be sure, it makes sense to conceptualize the tribes as sovereigns that, due to their
unique situation, cannot exercise the full measure of their sovereign powers.... But
I do not see how this is consistent with the apparently "undisputed fact that
121. Id. at 1637 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206) ("[Wle do not read any ... cases as holding that
the Constitution forbids Congress to change 'judicially made' federal Indian law ...."); id. at 1636
(stating that in the field of federal Indian law "the Court should [not] second-guess the political
branches' own determinations").
122. Id. ("Congress has enacted a new statute, relaxing restrictions on the bounds of the inherent
tribal authority that the United States recognizes. And that fact makes all the difference.").
123. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
124. Id. at 1640.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1641.
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Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters ...."
The sovereign is, by definition, the entity "in which independent and supreme
authority is vested." It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty not to exist
merely at the whim of an external government.
127
Accordingly, because neither the Indian Commerce Clause nor the Treaty
Clause can be construed to invest Congress with plenary power to "calibrate the
'metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty,", 128  either Congress lacks the
constitutional authority to alter the inherent sovereignty of tribes, and thus
precedential cases that have affirmed this power in Congress at the expense of
129tribal sovereignty have been wrongly decided, or, if the power to expand or
contract Indian sovereignty is of extraconstitutional origin and properly wielded
by Congress, then Indian nations are, quite simply, not sovereigns even in a
130limited Cherokee sense.
Describing federal Indian law as "at odds with itself, '131 Justice Thomas
purported to resolve the tension between plenary power and sovereignty by
coupling a structural analysis of the relationship between Indian tribes, states, and
the United States with an assessment of the practice of the political branches. The
failure of the Constitution to allocate sovereignty to Indian tribes, in his view,
relegated them to a subordinate position in the constitutional framework beneath
that of the states and the federal government, with respect to which the
127. Id. at 1643-44 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) and Black's Law Dictionary 1395 (6th
ed., West 1990).
128. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting majority at 1635); see also id. at 1647 ("I cannot agree that the
Indian Commerce Clause 'provide[s] Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian
affairs."') (quoting majority at 1633); id. at 1648 ("The treaty power does not, as the Court seems to
believe, provide Congress with free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics that could
potentially implicate some unspecified [Indian] treaty.").
129. See id. at 1645 (suggesting, contrary to existing case law, that if plenary power is without
constitutional foundation and tribes are inherently sovereign, Indian tribes have the sovereign
authority "to punish anyone who violates their laws," including non-Indians) (emphasis in original); but
see id. at 1648:
I find it difficult to reconcile [cases affirming Indian legal sovereignty] with Congress' 1871
prospective prohibition on the making of treaties with the Indian tribes. The Federal
Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every aspect of the
tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain that the tribes possess
anything resembling 'sovereignty.'
Prior to dismissing the first of these two observations with the second, Justice Thomas appeared prone
to embrace the "logical consequence" of discrediting plenary power-"that nearly every law made by
Congress and nearly every case decided by the Supreme Court over the last two centuries seeking to
impose or sanctioning the imposition of power over Native Americans is invalid because it conflicts
with the inherent and recognized sovereignty of Native nations." Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the
Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 217, 219
(1993).
130. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1643-44.
131. Id. at 1648. In light of his interpretation of the Constitution as offering inadequate support for
congressional plenary power and no justification for the coexistence of plenary power with Indian
sovereignty, Justice Thomas urged the Court to "ask the logically antecedent question whether
Congress (as opposed to the President) has [plenary] power" and to thereby provide a more coherent
"foundation for the analysis of the sovereignty issues posed by this case." Id. at 1648 (emphasis
omitted).
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Constitution does make such an allocation.'32 Even more importantly, the gloss on
the constitutional text supplied by centuries of congressional assertions of plenary
power to enact a great welter of statutes hostile to tribal sovereignty, including an
1871 act terminating the making of treaties with Indian tribes133 and the imposition
of many of the protections of the Bill of Rights upon tribal judicial systems,13 in
conjunction with executive support of congressional actions, supported the
conclusion that the political branches have evolved a common policy
presumptively, although not conclusively, disfavoring tribal sovereignty.35
Although his analysis of the Constitution and subsequent legislative history
led him to conclude, in dicta, that he "do[es] not necessarily agree that the tribes
have any residual inherent sovereignty,' 36 Justice Thomas rested his concurrence
on institutional separation of powers concerns that dictated a limited judicial role
in the making of federal Indian law: in his reasoning, judges do not supply final
and authoritative interpretations of the Constitution when deciding Indian law
cases but merely analyze treaties, statutes, and executive orders to ascertain and
effectuate the present intent of the political branches. 37 In short, it is to the
"authoritative pronouncements of the political branches' '138 as to their prevailing
policy, as evidenced by congressional and executive practice-not to the
Constitution-that judges must look to ascertain the answer to the question of
whether a specific exercise of tribal sovereignty is legally permissible. Because
federal Indian law is more politics than law, "[w]hen the political branches
demonstrate that a particular exercise of the tribes' sovereign power is in fact
132. See id. at 1644 ("[T]he States (unlike the tribes) are part of a constitutional framework that
allocates sovereignty between the State and Federal Governments and specifically grants Congress
authority to legislate with respect to them .... The tribes.., are not part of this constitutional order,
and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it." (citation omitted)).
133. See id. at 1644 (citing Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §71) (2000)) (providing that "no Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty").
134. See Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1644 n. 2 (citing Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303
(2000)) (limiting tribal powers to define and punish offenses and imposing substantive due process
provisions of Article III and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Constitution upon tribal governments).
135. One long-standing theory of constitutional interpretation, exercised often in the field of national
security and foreign relations law, maintains that "a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,... may be treated as a gloss
on 'executive Power' vested in the President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Although Justice Thomas did not make a direct citation to
Youngstown, the substance of his opinion evinces support for the theory that the political branches can
jointly supply meaning to the words of the Constitution, as well as the understanding that Indian law is,
in some sense, foreign relations law.
136. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1647.
137. See id. at 1646:
[Critically, our cases have never drawn th[e] line [defining permissible assertions of tribal
sovereignty] as a constitutional matter. That is why we have analyzed extant federal law
(embodied in treaties, statutes, and Executive Orders) before concluding that particular
tribal assertions of power were incompatible with the position of the tribes.
See also id. at 1647 ("[lIt does not follow that this Court's federal-common-law decisions limiting
tribes' authority to exercise their inherent sovereignty [such as Duro] somehow become enshrined as
constitutional holdings that the political branches cannot alter.").
138. Id. at 1646.
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consistent with federal policy, the underpinnings of a federal-common-law
decision disabling the exercise of that tribal power disappear."139
D. The Dissent
In dissent, Justices Souter and Scalia defended judicial primacy in the
making of federal Indian law by elevating the description of tribes as domestic
dependencies into a constitutional principle and holding that Congress lacked the
power under the Constitution to "control the interpretation of [the Duro fix] in a
way that is at odds with the constitutional consequences of the tribes' continuing
dependent status."14 In describing the grant of authority conveyed by Congress in
the Duro fix as a delegation on the ground that, once divested, even if an erstwhile
sovereign power is restored it can never again acquire inherent status, the
dissenters insisted that it is the judges, and not the political branches, who are
empowered to say what federal Indian law is and that when they do so they are
undertaking constitutional analysis-the quintessentially judicial function-rather
than making federal common law.141 In contrast, the political branches, for
Justices Souter and Scalia, are cabined within much narrower boundaries and left
free only to undertake "independent elaboration ... of the fine details of the
tribes' dependent position.' ' 142 Viewed in this light, principles of stare decisis
compel the dissenters to conclude that the Court must not lightly abandon prior
pronouncements on the complex question of tribal sovereignty,143 and, even more
significantly, that if the political branches wish to reinvest tribes with the power to
prosecute non-members they cannot do so through legislation: rather, they must
unambiguously repudiate the domestic dependent status of the tribes by thrusting
them beyond the constitutional framework and the reach of the Court through a
grant of independence.' 44
E. Analysis
Although seven of nine justices voted to recognize the Duro fix as having
authorized Indian tribes to exercise the power to try non-member Indians, it
would strain credulity to characterize Lara as a victory for Indian sovereignty.
Rather than denouncing plenary power as a colonialist relic contravened by
principles of justice and morality, or at least jettisoning the implied divestiture
doctrine to invalidate Oliphant and its progeny, the majority, attributing to
139. Id. at 1647.
140. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1651.
141. Id. at 1650 ("When we enquire whether the two prosecuting entities draw their authority to
punish the offender from distinct sources of power, . . we are undertaking a constitutional analysis
based on legal categories of constitutional dimension . (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
142. Id.
143. See id. ("[P]rinciples of stare decisis are particularly compelling in the law of tribal jurisdiction,
an area peculiarly susceptible to confusion.").
144. See id. (opining that the "only two ways that a tribe's inherent sovereignty could be restored"
are through judicial repudiation of the doctrine of domestic dependency-a violation of the principle
of stare decisis-or through a grant of independence).
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plenary power an extraconstitutional pedigree that reinforces congressional power
at the expense of judicial review of its exercise, rested its holding upon the very
mechanism that has functioned for nearly two centuries as destroyer of Indian
sovereignty. Nothing in the majority opinion guarantees any future limits to the
unbridled judicial role of imposing common law limitations on tribal sovereignty;
on the contrary, the majority promises only to recognize Congress's power to
"change 'judicially made' federal Indian law"'145 through legislation. Any
expectations that the Court will become a more attractive custodian of tribal
sovereignty will find no succor in Lara, which the Court plainly regarded as a
separation of powers, rather than an Indian law, case.
Worse still, Justice Kennedy, without discounting the continued vitality of
plenary power, wrote separately to defend a role for the judicial branch in the
review of its exercise and warned that any residual inherent sovereignty that
survived Lara may have a precarious future to the extent that its exercise, in
regard to non-members, trenches upon constitutionally protected rights. In short,
even the most Indian-friendly Congress of the future-one that would go much
further than the Duro fix and legislate to restore tribal criminal and civil
jurisdiction over all those who set foot in Indian country-may not be able to
prevent the Court from further restricting the exercise of tribal sovereignty, or
disposing of it altogether, if Justice Stevens's view of the appropriate judicial role
in the review of plenary power gains favor.
If Lara is nothing more than the juxtaposition of a close embrace of an
expansive understanding of plenary power and an internal judicial debate over the
delineation of the institutional boundary separating political from judicial powers
within the canon of federal Indian law, tribal sovereigntists will still have struck, at
best, a Faustian bargain. Judicial plenary power bites as hard as the congressional
variant: there is no practical distinction between the two; both have colonialist
consequences. Embracing any variant of plenary power for the purpose of
acquiring jurisdiction over non-member Indians, only to be subjected to
divestment of this aspect of jurisdiction and more at some future date either by
Congress or the Court, would only attrit Indian sovereignty still further.
Still more disconcertingly, Lara reveals that the date of ultimate divestment
may not be long in coming. Justice Thomas, opining that the political branches
are jointly endowed with the power to craft federal Indian policies that utterly
destroy Indian sovereignty (if Indian sovereignty, subsequent to the advent of
plenary power, can even be said to exist), had the temerity to cry out that the
emperor has no clothes and that federal Indian law is little more than politics
strutting about in nonexistent judicial garb that everyone is merely pretending to
see for fear of being branded, as are all those who cannot see the magnificent
raiments, as dimwitted. Moreover, although they are far more skeptical of
congressional plenary power and much more defensive of judicial turf in the
interpretation of the constitutionality of its assertion, Justices Souter and Scalia
145. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1637 (quoting Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206)
[Vol. 40:71
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reach the same conclusions as Justice Thomas regarding the ultimate power of the
political branches over Indian tribes. For at least these three justices, and possibly
for all nine, the power of Congress and the President to perpetuate the
suppression of Indian sovereignty is a nonjusticiable foreign policy question, and
the status of Indian tribes as domestic dependencies-a principle to which
Congress and the executive have for centuries been committed-renders it highly
improbable that the trajectory of Indian sovereignty will do ere else but head
south, even if only incrementally, in the future.
If the future holds true to form, a series of defeats should follow hot on the
heels of the "victory" in Lara. The Indian Removal Act 146 made a mockery of
Cherokee Nation; a passel of plenary power-based legislation subverted Worcester
and trumped Crow Dog; and Oliphant and the implied divestiture doctrine
denatured Wheeler.147 Lara is not the end of the story: a legislative expansion of
the Indian Civil Rights Act, imposing still more of the substantive provisions of
the Bill of Rights upon tribal governments, 148 and even the repeal of the Duro fix
in response to the equal protection and due process concerns raised by Justice
Kennedy and collateral litigation 149 are not beyond contemplation. Moreover,
Congress is not the only player; each of the three branches of government has a
part in this morality play. Should the legislative branch fail to respond to the
signals sent by Lara, one may expect the Court, particularly if its membership is
augmented in the coming years by activist justices unsympathetic to the merits of
Indian sovereignty claims and skeptical of congressional plenary power, to be on
guard for cases in which to extend the implicit divestiture doctrine at the expense
of the remnants of Indian sovereignty. If this comes to pass, then with another
Lara, implicit divestiture will ripen into de facto judicial termination, and Indian
sovereignty will finally be undone. 5°
Still, if in the final analysis Lara is a Pyrrhic victory, Indian sovereigntists
must refuse to emulate Pyrrhus by, figuratively speaking, abandoning the field and
sailing for home. Rather, they should heed the dissent. Justices Souter and Scalia
advise us that destruction of Indian sovereignty is not remediable within the U.S.
politico-legal framework and that the sole mode whereby sovereignty can be
146. See Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (declaring all Cherokee laws invalid
and ordering forced relocation of Cherokee Tribe). Gloating after passage of the Indian Removal Act,
President Jackson, still furious over the decision in Worcester, is reported to have remarked, "John
Marshall has made his decision; let him enforce it now if he can." Fergus M. Bordewich, Killing the
White Man's Indian: Reinventing Native Americans at the End of the Twentieth Century 46-47
(Doubleday 1996). More than four thousand Cherokees died during the Trail of Tears. Id. at 47.
147. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191; Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313; Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556; Worcester, 31 U.S.
515.
148. See supra at nn. 80, 134, 307 (discussing the Indian Civil Rights Act). Several proposals to effect
just such an amendment have already been offered. See infra n. 307.
149. See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/2207-97, slip op. at 1-2 (Chinle Dist. Ct. July 20,
1998) (challenging the criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation over a non-member Indian).
150. Some commentators have concluded that Indian sovereignty has been dead for a half century,
the victim of plenary power. See e.g. Cross, supra n. 50, at 371 (referencing "realist" Indian law
scholars).
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reinvested in Indian nations is via independence.' While this observation was
likely offered to support a view of Indian sovereignty as a quaint, but ultimately
unhelpful, historical anachronism and to counsel against Indian independence, it
bears close scrutiny nevertheless. Indeed, the entire history of federal Indian law
from M'Intosh to Lara has been a steady retreat from the international legal
presumption that Indian nations are in fact nations coequal to all the other nations
of the earth and entitled to assert sovereignty and legal jurisdiction over all
persons and to the limits of their territorial authority.52 It is now time to hold
ground and fight. Indians have a right and duty to live by Indian law,'53 and all
who enter Indian country-whether Indian or non-Indian, member or non-
member-should be subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate Indian
sovereign, just as all those who enter France, or China, or Sudan, regardless of
nationality and notwithstanding any concerns about the substantive quality of
justice offered by those sovereigns, are subject to the jurisdiction of those nations
by virtue of their entry, which implies consent. 154 Those who wish to avoid Indian
jurisdiction, whether due to their perceptions regarding tribal justice or for any
other reason, need only refrain from setting foot therein.
Because, as the next part will demonstrate, federal Indian law fails to offer-
and, as Marshall made plain in M'Intosh, given its obligation to justify the history
of conquest by the political system that creates it, will never offer-any coherent
legal or moral justification for the destruction of Indian sovereignty,'55
independence from its constraints must become the lodestar of our journey. To
justify this mission it is necessary to develop the argument that federal Indian law
is not merely imperfect but rather a profoundly flawed and morally bankrupt legal
system within which justice for Indian nations is a practical impossibility,
necessitating and rationalizing complete disassociation.
151. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1650-51.
152. The presumption that the territorial state possesses exclusive criminal and civil jurisdiction over
its nationals as well as over non-nationals to its territorial limits is the most basic principle in the
international law of jurisdiction. Oppenheim, supra n. 33, at §§ 137, 399. Although domestic
jurisprudence incorporates this principle, confirming that "[a] basic attribute of full territorial
sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether
citizens or aliens," Duro, 495 U.S. at 685, federal Indian law offers no logical explanation-save for
race-based considerations-for differentiating between Indians and non-Indians in allowing Indian
tribes to exercise only limited territorial jurisdiction.
153. Indian law is an aspect of Indian culture, and observation of Indian culture is central to living as
an Indian. As a Seminole elder reminds us, "[w]e can't accept the law of others. We are not any better
than other people, but we have our own law. We can't let go of our law, because it directs us where we
need to go." Bobby Billie, The Independent Traditional Seminole Nation: Defending Our Heritage and
Our Land, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 337, 337 (2001).
154. For an elaboration of this "implied consent" theory, see Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone
Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical State of American Indian Law, 38
Tulsa L. Rev. 113,127-28 (2002).
155. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 591-92 (noting that, despite the injustice of the genocide and land
expropriation perpetrated against Indian nations, "if [legal arguments justifying these practices] be
indispensable to that system under which the [United States] has been settled .... [they] certainly
cannot be rejected by Courts").
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IV. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AS AN EVIL LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Conflicts between Law and Morality: Positivism and Naturalism
1. Positivism
The relationship between law and morality has been the subject of vigorous
academic debate for millennia. 56  For legal positivists,'57 universal moral
agreement as to the proper set of legal norms and principles that ought to
constitute a legal regime is impossible, as is any universally accepted protocol for
deciding between moral claims. 58  Accordingly, positivists conclude that a
generalized adherence to law, notwithstanding the normative content of the
constitutive rules of the given legal regime, is the best defense against the anarchy
that would result if individuals were entitled to form and apply their own
particular judgments as to the utility of obedience.15 9 The separation thesis, which
provides that legal obligations are entirely separate from moral obligations,1
6 °
shelters law from moral criticism, and "the admission that a rule is a valid legal
rule preclude[s] . . . condemnation of it by reference to moral standards or
principles.'
161
In short, positivism enforces an amoral duty of fidelity to law requiring
obedience even where the law itself is immoral; 62 when confronted with a law
perceived as unjust or even evil, the legal decisionmaker is obliged to consider law
and morality independently of each other and, whatever his personal moral
judgments or policy preferences as to the extralegal validity of the substantive
156. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Harv. U. Press 1977)
(discussing the intellectual history of the debate over the relationship between law and morality).
157. A broad array of scholars committed to the premise that legal rules deserve adherence
notwithstanding the subjective evaluations of the normative content of the rules but otherwise
differentiable in many regards are lumped together under the rubric "positivists" and distinguished
from "antipositivists" for the sake of theoretical parsimony and clarity.
158. See e.g. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 5, 8 (2d ed., U. Notre Dame
Press 1984) (concluding, from observations of contemporary moral debates, that there "seems to be no
rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture" and that as a consequence the debate is
"necessarily interminable").
159. See David Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the
Perspective of Legal Philosophy 4 (Clarendon Press 1991) (warning against the anarchy that would
issue if judges were given license to declare laws invalid because they failed to accord with "right
reason"); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 598
(1958) (describing the anarchist's method of legal reasoning: "This ought not to be the law, therefore it
is not and I am free not merely to censure but to disregard it."); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics
Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 901, 915-16 (1995) (noting
that early positivist scholars such as Jeremy Bentham and John Austin privileged obedience to law
over the general freedom to criticize law on utilitarian grounds).
160. See generally Hart, supra n. 159.
161. H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 3 (Stan. U. Press 1963).
162. See Strassberg, supra n. 159, at 917 (characterizing the positivist position: "The question of the
"Law's" immorality or evilness [i]s simply not a legal question, since legal obligation stood independent
from the substance of the law." (citing Dyzenhaus, supra n. 159, at 16).
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command, apply the law. 63 For positivists, legal reasoning is not only autonomous
from political and ethical choice, but the most monstrous laws are nevertheless
laws that deserve adherence and merit enforcement. 64 Law is not a rough attempt
to codify reason or justice but rather the "command of the sovereign" backed by
the threat of sanctions in the absence of compliance. 65 Positivism supplants
reason as the source of legal obligation with "fear; fear of violence, fear of lost
liberty, advantage or amenity, or fear of social disapproval."'
' 66
2. Naturalism
For millennia, critics of positivism have propounded and defended the
notion that there exists a set of absolute and universal rules or precepts that,
although not ascertainable or discoverable by the deductive exercise of human
reason, nevertheless binds mankind and the political communities instituted to
govern the affairs of men on earth, trumping any inconsistent rules by virtue of its
intrinsic moral and rational merit. 67 Natural law, 68 an immediate and eternal
expression of the principles of rights and justice that though gleaned from
163. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 210-11 (2d ed., Clarendon Press 1994) (stating that "a
refusal ... to recognize evil laws as valid . . . is too crude a way with delicate and complex moral
issues"); Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre: Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik [Pure
Legal Teaching: Introduction to the Legal Method] 101 (Franz Deuticke 1934) ("Even law that is bad in
the opinion of the law applying organ has to be applied .... "); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv.
L. Rev. 1057, 1060 (1975) ("[Jiudicial decisions ... even in hard cases . . . characteristically are and
should be generated by principle not policy." Dworkin labeled as "principle" the reasoning behind the
positive legal rule and as "policy" the independent and subjective assessment of the norm
underpinning the legal rule in question.); Hart, supra n. 159, at 607 (insisting that the judge may not
integrate his personal morality within his legal decisionmaking but must rather make an exclusively
legal decision); David Luban, A Report on the Legality of Evil: The Case of the Nazi Judges, in Nazis in
the Courtroom: Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges under the Laws of the Third Reich
and Vichy, France, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1139, 1141 (1995) (characterizing positivism as "the legal
philosophy ... that law and morality are separate, that a statute can be legal even if it is wicked, and
thus that the question 'is it legal?' is totally distinct from the question 'is it moral?"').
164. Positivists ground the judicial obligation to apply even the most unjust and immoral law not
merely upon utilitarian considerations but upon arguably (quasi) moral foundations, attributing to the
fact of widespread public acceptance of the legal regime in question the existence of a moral duty to
adhere to the collective public preference. See e.g. Dyzenhaus, supra n. 159, at 251 (describing this
argument).
165. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge
U. Press 1995) (elaborating the "command theory" of positivism which holds that law is but the
"command" of the sovereign rather than a statement of morality or a pathway to justice).
166. Hall, supra n. 22, at 279.
167. See generally Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (Christopher Rowe trans., Oxford U. Press 2002)
(explaining that the rules of natural law are those norms universally recognized by civilized men and
differentiating natural law from conventional justice); Louis Ren6 Beres, On Assassination as
Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 321, 328 n. 31 (1991) (tracing the
development of natural law from ancient Hebraic philosophers through the ancient Greeks and
Romans to the present).
168. The term "lex aeterna" is sometimes used to refer to natural law, although the latter is better
understood as a subset of the former inasmuch as the lex aeterna includes universal principles of
"cosmic reason" that human reason has yet to discover. Louis Rend Beres, The Oslo Agreements in
International Law, Natural Law, and World Politics, 14 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 715, 728 (1997).
Despite its ancient lineage, natural law, for reasons discussed infra, is "almost as foreign to American
legal consciousness of the twenty-first century as honor," and thus the term requires some elaboration.
Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 Am. J. Intl. L. 313, 326
(2001).
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observation of the natural universe and referenced as the "ultimate origin of law"
and the "beginning of moral life proper,"1 69 long antedates the origin of man170 and
is effectively "super-law": where, by the contrivance of man-made institutions,
natural law is forced into conflict with positive sources of regulation that are out of
harmony with human reason or that represent the arbitrary construction of
opinion or base assertion of power, natural law not only prevails over the "will of
human governors"17' but rejects utterly the notion that such contrary statements of
obligation have the force of law. Put very simply, for naturalists, natural legal
philosophy provides the supreme source of normative guidance for and judgment
of human conduct, demarcates the legal universe, affirmatively prescribes rights
and duties, 7 2 and defines the limits of our legal reach in insisting that:
Only good laws are laws. And for a law to be good, it must be based, in one way or
another, upon natural law. If a human law is at variance with natural law it is no
longer legal.
173
Accordingly, naturalists reject the separation thesis in favor of the coherence
thesis, which holds that morality and legal rules are not severable into "wholly
separate worlds, '14 and insist that, because there are no immoral laws, any "law"
that is immoral, as well as any immoral interpretation of an otherwise moral law,
carries no legal force at all. 17 5 For these critics, legal reasoning is indistinct from
policy analysis: all law is "policy and nothing more," and the correct legal solution
169. A.P. d'Entr~ves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy 122 (H.J. Paton ed.,
Hutchinson & Co. 1960).
170. See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law 4-5
(Cornell U. Press 1955) ("[Natural law] principles were made by no human hands" and either
"antedate deity itself' or else "so express its nature as to bind and control it." (emphasis omitted));
Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society 288 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils trans., Harvard U.
Press 1954) ("Natural law [is] the collective term for those norms which owe their legitimacy not to
their origin from a legitimate lawgiver, but to their immanent [sic] and teleological qualities."); Louis
Ren6 Beres, International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11 Loy. L.A. Intl. &
Comp. L.J. 25, 34 (1989) ("Not of today or yesterday its force ... It springs eternal; no man know its
birth." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Although natural legal philosophy has a
branch that posits the origin of natural law stems from the expressed will of a divine creator, a branch
of natural law contends that even in the absence of a divinity the authority of natural law is rooted in
the objective analysis of the natural order of the universe from which generalizations can be drawn and
that the origin of this natural order is not relevant for purposes of establishing the authority of natural
law.
171. See Corwin, supra n. 170, at 4-5 (insisting that only those "human laws" created through the
faithful "discovery and declaration" of natural law and codified as a precise "record or transcript" of
the same deserve recognition as law (emphasis omitted)).
172. Natural law creates both negative and positive rights and duties. See Christian Thomasius,
Fundamenta luris Naturae et Gentium, in The Philosophy of Law (W. Hastie trans., 1887)
(distinguishing natural law as a source of affirmative and negative obligations and rights).
173. d'Entrives, supra n. 169, at 81-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630,
656 (1958).
175. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 53-59 (Yale U. Press 1964) (extending evaluation of law
on moral grounds to the process of its interpretation); Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie [Legal
Philosophy] 344-46 (1973) ("[Wlhere justice is not even aimed at, where equity, this nucleus of justice,
is knowingly refused entry in the process of the creation of a positive law, then the law is not simply
unjust, it is devoid of all legality."); Hart, supra n. 159, at 617-18 (noting that for critics of positivism,
immoral laws were not laws at all and some permissible acts were prohibited by natural law, a higher
form of legal commandment).
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to a particular legal problem is identical to the correct moral and ethical solution
to that legal problem.176 Judges are not simply morally agnostic machines created
to apply law: rather, judges are moral agents who create and apply moral norms
through judicial interpretation. 77 and who are constantly charged with the moral
178duty to exercise and be guided by their consciences.
B. The Problem of the Evil Legal System
Positivism and antipositivism have provided starkly different answers to the
age-old question-what must legal decisionmakers do when confronted by laws
that are evil on their face or as applied, or, more pointedly posed, "Should the
judge park his conscience at the courthouse door in applying law?"', 79  For
positivists, evil laws pose moral, but not legal, dilemmas, and judges are duty
bound to apply the law as written whatever the consequences to their own moral
sensibilities.18° In contrast, antipositivists argue that the separation thesis at the
core of positivism champions law at the expense of justice, creates a dangerous
moral refuge for those judges and lawyers who recognize the immorality of the
law while blinding others to moral concerns, and effectively greases the skids for
the creation and implementation of substantively evil legal regimes. Accordingly,
antipositivists charge legal decisionmakers with the general obligation, in applying
law, to integrate moral considerations and to "be guided not simply by its words
but also by some conception of what is fit and proper .... ,,181 Law must yield
morally defensible outcomes, and where it cannot or will not it must yield to
justice.182
176. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique 40, 47 (David Kairys ed., Pantheon Bks. 1982).
177. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685,
1717-22 (1976) (describing the antipositivistic, or "altruistic," approach to the judicial function); see
also Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. Leg.
Stud. 335, 336 (1980) ("The law is a moral science, and judges, in determining the law, decide as moral
agents.").
178. Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law 61, 63 n. 13 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., Oxford U. Press 2002).
179. Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on 'Nazis in the Courtroom,' in Nazis in the Courtroom:
Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France,
61 Brook. L. Rev. 1122, 1122 (1995).
180. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France 71 (Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed., 1955)
(judging natural law to be too theoretically impoverished to provide moral guidance to modem society
and concluding that legal obedience is the lesser of evils); Luban, supra n. 163, at 1141 ("[P]ositivism
made the German judges treat law the way that German soldiers treated orders: Where the soldier
says, 'An order is an order,' the judges said, 'A law is a law."' (quoting Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes
of Legal Philosophy, in Philosophy of Law 103, 103 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed.,
Wadsworth Publg. Co. 1991))). Although early positivists accepted in principle the argument that evil
legal regimes could arise, they insisted that the value of generalized legal obedience would almost
invariably outweigh the evils associated therewith. See e.g. H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in
Jurisprudence and Political Theory 7, 80-81 (Oxford U. Press 1982); see also Austin, supra n. 165, at 158
(noting that if one were to challenge a law gravely contrary to morality as not binding, "the Court of
Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of [that] reasoning by hanging [him] up, in pursuance of
the law of which [he] ha[s] impugned the validity.").
181. Lon L. Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 59 (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers 1968).
182. Radbruch, supra n. 175, at 346.
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The capture and perversion of the German state by Nazism, ascribed by
antipositivists to the passive complicity of positivist German judges with the
Nazis, 83 drew the theoretical argument about the appropriate response to
fundamentally evil legal systems into the arena of practical politics. The positivist
faith in the rule of law as the last line of defense against anarchy and tyranny was
profoundly shaken, and many positivists, without altogether abandoning the
separation thesis, retreated from their earlier absolutism and conceded that law is
little more than a dumb instrument susceptible to good or ill depending upon the
designs of its wielder.' 4 Other positivists still went further and counseled judges,
facing the necessity of applying an evil law, to either resign or to misrepresent the
meaning of the law so as to denature it of its immorality.1
5
Antipositivists, building upon the Nazi example with subsequent evidence
from apartheid-era South Africa and a retrospective examination of slavery,
extended the critique of positivism by defending the coherence thesis against
positivist miscarriages of justice and hypothesizing the existence of a set of
minimum characteristics that all legal regimes must satisfy in order to be deemed
sufficiently moral as to be worthy of obedience.186 Laws that do not meet this
threshhold are not laws, and do not give rise to moral conflicts. While the state
has the physical power to impose and enforce unjust rules, it can make no moral
187
claims of any entitlement to obedience and must rely upon naked coercion.
183. See Hart, supra n. 159, at 617 (explaining that antipositivists claimed a causal relationship
between positivism and the implementation of Nazi totalitarianism); Arthur Kaufmann, National
Socialism and German Jurisprudence from 1933 to 1945, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1629, 1633 (1988)
(attributing the capitulation of German judges to Nazism to a slavish commitment to positivism and
querying whether "a career in jurisprudence renders one incapable of recognizing and opposing
injustice"); Luban, supra n. 163, at 1141 (stating that German judges permitted the "professional duty
to maintain the rule of law" to overwhelm their responsibility to exercise moral judgment).
184. See e.g. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 L. Q. Rev. 195, 208 (1977). Some
positivists have modified their doctrine by distinguishing "legal-moral obligations," defined as "legal
obligation[s] in the moral sense," from "intra-systemic" legal obligations, defined as rules that establish
penalties for disobedience that apply solely within the legal system in question. Finnis, supra n. 22, at
33. Others declare the "uncoupling" of authority and obligation by concluding that "[r]ulers and their
officials ... [are] acknowledged as having authority, including moral authority to make and enforce
law, and the right not to be usurped, while at the same time none of their laws, not even those imposing
intra-systemic legal obligations, would create any legal obligation in the moral sense." Id.
185. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 362-67 (1978). Nazism forced legal positivism
to become more sophisticated, and what might be termed neopositivist theories increasingly draw
closer to naturalism as they incorporate moral elements and moral judgments within otherwise
descriptive theories of law. See Roger A. Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought
(Oxford U. Press 1992) (describing and critiquing positivist transformations).
186. See Fuller, supra n. 175, at 5-10, 39 (hypothesizing that a moral legal system must possess the
following characteristics: (1) administrators who scrupulously adhere to (2) preestablished and (3)
publicized rules that are (4) comprehensible but are (5) not retroactive, (6) not contradictory of other
rules, (7) not impossible to follow, and (8) not ever-changing). Apartheid-era South Africa erected an
evil, racist regime that failed to satisfy these eight conditions of the morality of law. Id. at 160.
Antebellum judges in the United States-an almost exclusively positivist cohort-were, in the main,
similarly complicit with a system of law they thought immoral. See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice
Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 8-30 (Yale U. Press 1975).
187. Hilaire McCoubrey, Natural Law, Religion and the Development of International Law, in
Religion and International Law 177, 177-78 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1999).
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Still, even if antipositivists can claim ascendancy over their positivist
colleagues within the legal academy, developing a theory of law in regard to an
evil legal system is a far less daunting feat than providing practical guidance to
legal decisionmakers who must directly engage with moral issues within such a
system. Positivists, not entirely as committed to the separation thesis as they once
were, but otherwise unwilling to proclaim that unjust laws lack legal force, have
acquiesced when others urged judges and other legal actors to engage in civil
disobedience and even to resign from offices that would require them to apply
manifestly evil laws;'88 most antipositivists have been far less effective in
integrating theory with praxis.189  Antipositivists, while conscious of the
possibilities inherent in the constitutional design that permit judicial officials to
counter majoritarianism by the exercise of judicial review,' 90 remain skeptical that
the gravitational force of public support for evil legal regimes will tolerate much
deviation, let alone more radical judicial renunciations of black letter law, in the
name of justice. 91
In sum, positivism denies, or at the very least attributes little theoretical
significance to, the evil legal system, while antipositivism, although it is well suited
to providing an answer to the logically antecedent question of how one identifies
an evil legal system, offers little useful instruction to the decisionmaker committed
to the integration of law and morality in the adjudication of rights and duties
notwithstanding the crushing force of a fundamentally unjust legal order. The
development of an ideal-typic antipositivist theory of law and morality would
facilitate not only the identification, but even potentially the remediation, of the
evil legal system. Federal Indian law, as the next part demonstrates, is fertile
terrain for such an endeavor.
188. Cover, supra n. 186, at 150-54 (noting that pre-Civil War positivists believed the sole permissible
course of action for antislavery judges called upon to remit recaptured slaves to their owners as the law
then required was not to deny the legality of the law but to resign judicial office).
189. See e.g. Nazis in the Courtroom: Lessons from the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges under the
Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 1154, 1155 (1995) (comments of Jack B.
Weinstein) (offering no affirmative theory of the appropriate judicial response to the evil legal system
and indicating instead that "[olf the various options available to American judges when faced with an
immoral law, only one is ruled out: silent acquiescence").
190. See Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional
Theory, 14 Const. Comment. 271, 282 (1997) (noting that institutional theories of U.S.
constitutionalism regard judicial review as "a deviant institution in a democratic society" because the
judiciary, a "countermajoritarian force[,] ... thwart[s] the will of the representatives of the ...
people...." (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 128, 16-17 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962))).
191. See e.g. id. at 315-18 (presenting institutionalist and historicist arguments suggesting that the
very act of embedding evil principles and values within a constitutional framework diminishes future
remedial possibilities).
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C. Rethinking Federal Indian Law as An Evil Legal System
1. General Presumptions about the U.S. Legal System
Nearly all serious observers, called to assess whether the U.S. legal order is
an evil legal system, would likely reach the following three conclusions: (1) the
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,92 a "public calamity"193 that ratified the
constitutional status of African American slaves as property bereft of civil and
political rights, was the worst judgment ever rendered by the Supreme Court;194
(2) the United States, although born in original sin, "made only one historical
mistake-slavery"; 195 and (3) while still imperfect, the United States has reclaimed
and even extended the wisdom and virtue of the framers of its Constitution by
thoroughly repudiating slavery and becoming in the process the global exemplar
in the remediation of historic injustices and the promotion and defense of human
rights.' 96
Moreover, many scholars would likely concur in the following three
additional assessments: (1) if the rights and freedoms of racial minorities within
the United States are not yet inviolable, breaches of a well-articulated body of
public law securing the fundamental and equal civil and political rights of all
persons are almost exclusively private acts for which remedies are available at
law;' 97 (2) although positivism still reigns as the governing jurisprudential
paradigm, 198 when "hard cases '99 arise, the U.S. legal system is not so irretrievably
192. 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (holding that African-descended slaves are not U.S. citizens but rather
property without civil or political rights).
193. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation, Methods and
Achievements.- An Interpretation 50 (Colum. U. Press 1928).
194. Walter Ehrlich, Scott v. Sandford, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United
States 759, 761 (Kermit L. Hall ed., Oxford U. Press 1992).
195. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 283, 297 (2000) (noting that many Americans erroneously reach this conclusion).
196. By the early nineteenth century most U.S. lawyers and judges accepted that slavery was a
fundamentally immoral institution in conflict with natural law, Cover, supra n. 186, at 34, and the
United States was ultimately willing to fight a bloody conflict to terminate its legal existence.
Moreover, U.S. perfectibility has been much on display since the final year of the Cold War: the
United States and its political subdivisions have apologized to or compensated Japanese American
internees, native Hawaiians, civilians killed in the Korean War, and African American victims of
medical experiments, racial violence, and lending discrimination. See William Bradford, Beyond
Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 Ohio St. L.J. - (forthcoming 2005) (surveying
history of U.S. remediation of claims of aggrieved groups). Furthermore, American commitments to
justice are not confined to the domestic arena: since the fall of the Berlin Wall the United States has
intervened in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo with the avowed purpose of defending fundamental
human rights.
197. For a critique of the fundamental premises of contemporary American liberal legal theory-
that the regime is fundamentally fair toward all persons and groups, that it treats like cases alike, and
that it has been placed upon an evolutionary course toward greater justice that requires at most only "a
little tinkering to make it perfect," see Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,
28 Buff. L. Rev. 205,217 (1979).
198. See Cover, supra n. 186, at 10, 34 (noting that natural law, "foundational" to the American legal
mind of the "late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries," was ultimately subordinated to
"constitutions, statutes, and well-settled precedent."); Luban, supra n. 163, at 1143 (noting that most
American lawyers have been "instinctive positivists" since at least the nineteenth century); Vagts,
supra n. 168, at 326.
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wedded to stare decisis or legislative supremacy that it refuses principles of justice
entry into the arena of legal combat,2°° and natural law can be successfully invoked
in defense of the rights of racial minorities;201 and (3) any hostile majoritarian
tendencies are kept in check by a watchful and evermore active judiciary
empowered to wield judicial review in defense against legal revanchism, even to
the point of overturning longstanding case law precedents,2°  striking down
legislation and administrative actions,23 and offering up unpopular interpretations
of the Constitution in support of minority rights.2 4 Within the U.S. legal system,
199. See Dyzenhaus, supra n. 159, at 1 n. 2 (defining "hard cases" as those in respect to which, having
reviewed the facts and the applicable sources of law, "informed lawyers" can disagree in good faith as
to the proper result).
200. The principle of stare decisis, providing that once resolved the answer to a judicial question
should not be lightly overturned on the ground that to do so would seriously undermine the settled
expectations of those who have relied upon the answer to organize their lives and social relations, is a
fundamental principle of law common to civilized societies. See e.g. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) (refusing to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in reliance on the
principle of stare decisis and discussing the social importance of stare decisis). However, the
gravitational force of precedent within contemporary positivism is diminished under certain
circumstances, and several theories encourage deviation from earlier decisions when the social policies
advanced by those decisions are no longer justifiable on moral or ethical grounds, a circumstances
characterized as "institutional regret." See Dworkin, supra n. 163, at 1087-1101 (articulating a modified
positivist theory justifying departures from stare decisis under certain delimited conditions to achieve
fairness). Although few positivists are likely to embrace the realist position and reject the immutability
of precedent case law in favor of the view that judges are empowered to employ judicial review to
consider "the conflicting human values that are opposed in every controversy [and to] open the
courtroom to all evidence that will bring light to [the] delicate practical task of social adjustment," the
rigid fixation on stare decisis that marked earlier judicial eras is past. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 842 (1935).
Similarly, although the principle of legislative supremacy was arguably part of the constitutional
design inasmuch as all legislative powers are granted to Congress in Article I and the Constitution
makes no affirmative grant of judicial review, the political branches have long tolerated an expansive
judicial role in the practical administration of government, and it has become an article of faith within
the U.S. legal system that it is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also The Federalist No. 48 (James
Madison) (warning against the potential for legislative supremacy if the judicial branch did not have
the power to review the acts of the legislative and executive branches).
201. See e.g. John Quincy Adams, Argument before the Supreme Court in the Case of U.S. v. Cinque
(Feb. 24 & Mar. 1, 1841) (Adams appealed to natural legal principles to secure the liberty of Africans
who regained their liberty after having been taken slaves: "I know of no law ... no code, no treaty,
applicable to the proceedings of the Executive or the Judiciary, except ... the law of nature, and of
Nature's God on which our fathers placed our own national existence.") (available at http://amistad.
mysticseaport.org/library/court/supreme/1841.jqa.argument.l.html).
202. See e.g. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning, in regard to public education,
the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
203. See e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down policies of school boards denying to
Hispanic immigrant children access to public education on the ground of the unlawful immigration
status of their parents).
204. See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that the Constitution "does not
prohibit the ... narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body"). In other words, the U.S.
legal system, through the exercise of judicial review, simultaneously promotes the responsiveness of
the political branches to the collective interests of majorities while ensuring that the fundamental rights
of minorities are protected against majoritarian incursions. See generally Ely, supra n. 50.
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in other words, when interests conflict, minorities will not systematically lose to
majorities, at least when fundamental rights are at stake.2 °5
2. Overcoming Binary Thinking
Given the foregoing, it is understandable that the description as "evil" of a
legal system that has evolved to simultaneously champion popular sovereignty and
minority rights will strike many observers as incongruent with empirical reality.
However, it is only upon examination of evidence drawn from a critical analysis of
federal Indian law and its consequences that this characterization can be
supported and a more holistic assessment of the relative goodness of the U.S. legal
system can be made. Much of the discussion concerning the rights of racial
minorities in the United States centers around African Americans to the exclusion
of other groups, and this black-white paradigm, or "binary thinking"'206 in regard to
the intersection of race and law, undernourishes thought and action with respect
to Indian justice claims and impedes a more honest evaluation of the moral
foundations of the U.S. legal system.2° Challenging binary thinking is difficult:
merely understanding that the status of Indian people as the most materially
deprived,208 politically and economically dependent, and legally exposed group in
the nation 209 is an artifact of federal Indian law and policy requires broader and
deeper engagement with considerations of race, law, and justice than most
scholars have attempted. Recognizing that the perpetuation of Indian
subordination may be a greater threat to the moral integrity of the United States
205. For a broader discussion and critique of liberal constitutionalism and the possibilities for
harmonizing majoritarianism and minority rights, see generally Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of
Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 411 (1981).
206. See Delgado, supra n. 195, at 294 (noting that "binary thinking" not only "conceal[s] the
checkerboard of racial progress and retrenchment, [but also] hide[s] the way dominant society often
casts minority groups against one another, to the detriment of both"); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige,
Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 855, 899-900 (1995) (employing binary thinking: "[N]o
other group compares to [blacks] in the confluence of the characteristics that argue for" racial
remedies.).
207. By nominating African Americans as the primary victims of racial injury, "nonblack" claims are
rendered dependent upon the subscription of the white establishment. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer
Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto 168 (Macmillan Co. 1969) ("By defining the problem as one
of race and making race refer solely to black, Indians [a]re systematically excluded from consideration"
for redress.); Steve Russell, A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of American Indians in Racial
Policy Discourse, 4 Geo. Pub. Policy Rev. 129 (1999).
208. Indian reservations remain among the most impoverished areas in the United States. Whereas
between 8-14% of the U.S. population toils below the poverty line, the figure is 40% of all Indians,
with some tribes faring worse. See Bradford, supra n. 7, at 14 n. 54. Indian unemployment hovers at
40%, eight times the national average, and the median Indian family income is less than half the
national average. Anderson, supra n. 102, at 1. Underfunded reservation schools are some of the
worst in the United States. Atkinson, supra n. 28, at 421. The socioeconomic status of "urban"
Indians-the bulk of the Indian population-is no better. See Bradford, supra n. 7, at 14 n. 54.
Unemployment, infant mortality, suicide, homicide, substance abuse, homelessness, and poor health
are common: by every objective indicator Indians are the most disadvantaged group in the United
States. Anaya, supra n. 17 at 108 (describing Indians as "the poorest of the poor"); Ward Churchill,
Fantasies of the Master Race: Literature, Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians 7-8 (M.
Annette Jaimes ed., Coin. Courage Press 1992).
209. See supra at nn. 45-48, 56-58 (describing legal sources of Indian economic and political
dependency and legal exposure, including the trust doctrine and plenary power).
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than slavery-a far more profound indictment of the U.S. legal system-may still
be beyond the ken of most legal scholars.
3. Federal Indian Law as an Instrument of Colonialism
If the word "law" in the phrase "federal Indian law" is intended to connote a
set of nomological propositions that restrain the exercise of arbitrary power, or to
deny that the elaboration, interpretation, and application of treaties, statutes, and
judicial decisions governing U.S. relations with Indian tribes is a rule of man
venture, then the very act of using the phrase "federal Indian law," a deliberate
misnomer, may well be itself an act of colonialism. Discovery, although deeply
woven into case law precedents, firmly fixed in the legal consciousness and
210behavior of many non-Indians, and manifestly obvious in the facts on the
ground, has long been consigned to the ashcan of legal history as nothing more
211than an extralegal justification for conquest. Plenary power over Indian nations,
even when tempered by a trust responsibility, is not merely lacking in any
constitutional or international legal foundation;212 rather, it is a claim to racial
superiority intended to capitalize upon discovery, justify the unilateral abrogation
of Indian treaty rights, and subordinate the expression of Indian human rights.213
210. See Williams, supra n. 19, at 4 ("[Tlhose of European descent, be they Imperialist or Marxist,
rightist or leftist, still act upon the same historically conditioned consciousness that animated the New
World conquests of their colonizing forefathers.").
211. See e.g. Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845-37 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925)
(noting that although discovery was effective in granting exclusive rights to the discoverer relative to
other "civilized" nations to impair the title of the discovered indigenous people, "international law
underwent profound modifications between the end of the Middle-Ages and the end of the 1 9 1
h
century," and discovery had no legal force by the late 1800s); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Columbus's Legacy: Law As an Instrument of Racial Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples' Rights
of Self-Determination, 8 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 51, 75 (1991) (describing the discovery doctrine as a
legacy of racial discrimination that "provides the 'apology' for the privileges of power and aggression
[still] exercised by a race of colonizers over the colonized").
212. See Ward Churchill, Struggle for the Land: Native North American Resistance to Genocide,
Ecocide and Colonization 61 (Common Courage Press 2002) ("[Chief Justice John] Marshall's
interpretation stood the accepted meaning of international law squarely on its head" by discovering
plenary power and applying the trust doctrine); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy
Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 115-16 (2002) ("[T]he federal government has no
legitimate claim to legal supremacy over Indian tribes."); Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights Claims
of Indigenous Populations: The View from the Common Law, 31 U. Toledo L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1999)
(noting that "[n]othing is offered by way of justification" for the discovery doctrine and plenary
power); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal
Indian Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1754, 1760 (1997) (stating that nothing in the Constitution renders
"plenary power.., legitimate"); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev.
31, 43 (1996) [hereinafter Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law] (observing that "the text of the
Constitution lacks much of a hint of any plenary power"); McSloy, supra n. 129, at 225 (describing the
arrogation by Congress of plenary power over Indian tribes as "both unconstitutional and in violation
of international taw"); Porter, supra n. 8, at 949 ("Neither the Constitution nor any Indian treaty
provides that the [United States] shall have absolute power over the Indian nations ...."); id. at 950
("As a proposition of legal authority, . . . [plenary power] is certainly inconsistent with the approach of
both international and domestic constitutional law toward national power over domestic and foreign
sovereigns ...."); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1069, 1081 (2004)
("One cannot read the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes as a power to regulate the
Indian tribes themselves.").
213. See e.g. Porter, supra n. 8, at 902 (concluding that "'federal Indian control law' ... has the
twofold mission of establishing the legal bases for American colonization of the continent and
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The unholy troika of core doctrines has less to do with jurisprudence than with the
exercise and legitimation of the physical power necessary to take and hold land
and to defend the interest of the non-Indians who enter thereupon against the
rights of preexisting and coequal, if militarily less potent, sovereigns who have
never accepted the diminution of their sovereignty.2t 4 Simply put, "might makes
right," the thinly-veiled principle around which federal Indian law has been
constructed, is neither a legal argument nor the moral basis for a system of law.215
Compounding the foundational problem of federal Indian law is its
incorrigibility. Although common law courts, in recognition of evolving
constitutional, customary, or international legal and equitable principles, have
some measure of freedom to break from, or at least read narrowly, precedential
decisions, the remedial potential of a common law system does not often extend
beyond the normative boundaries of the sociopolitical environment in which it is
incubated. If the "common law can be expected to succeed only among peoples
who share some common conception of the bases of social order, 2 16 and if Indians
and non-Indians cannot agree that the subordination of Indian sovereignty-the
necessary precondition for the creation and maintenance of a settler-state upon
prior Indian sovereigns-was and continues to be fundamentally unjust,217 then
legal relations between Indian and non-Indian peoples may be "unsuited to
perpetuating American power and control over the Indian nations" (footnotes omitted)); Williams,
supra n. 57, at 264-65 (criticizing plenary power as a racist doctrine employed by Congress and the
judiciary to justify the unilateral abrogation of tribal treaty, property, and human rights).
214. See Williams, supra n. 20, at 312 (describing the primary task of federal Indian law as "merely to
fill in the details and rationalize the fictions by which Europeans legitimated the denial of the Indians'
rights in their acquisition of the Indians' America"); Porter, supra n. 8, at 999 (critiquing "federal
Indian control law" as an instrument of colonialism).
215. See Resnik, supra n. 78, at 134 (describing "Federal Indian Law [as] an illegitimate exercise in
power with no source of authority other than physical might"); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 25 (2002) (describing federal Indian law, along with
immigration law and aspects of national security law, as "deconstitutionalized zone[s]" in which power,
rather than legal principles, governs). Although might makes right is not a normative principle, it has
been, quite frequently in human history, an empirical fact:
The question of conquest introduces a practical monkey-wrench into this tidy theoretical
world. Your tribe or group takes over the territory of another; you kill their members or
throw them off their traditional lands. What principle determines ownership if the question
ever goes into litigation? The short answer is that God is on the side of the big battalions.
Epstein, supra n. 212, at 4.
216. Fuller, supra n. 181, at 109.
217. Attribution of savagery and inferiority to Indians as moral and legal justification for policies of
conquest and expropriation and as grounds for denying obligations to afford redress for these policies
date to the earliest foundations of the U.S. legal system and pervade the judiciary even up to the
present. See e.g. U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 435-37 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing
"cultural differences" of Plains Indians that "made conflict and brutal warfare inevitable" including
that Indians "'lived only for the day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they
thought they could get away with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without
flinching."' (quoting Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People 540 (Oxford
U. Press 1965)); M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590 (describing Indians as "fierce savages, whose occupation was
war" and with whom it was not possible for non-Indians to "mix"). Western legal thought continues to
regard Indians are alien and inferior in comparison to Western sociopolitical organization and tacitly
grounds perpetuation of hostile legal precedents on the basis of Indian inferiority.
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regulation by the methods of the common law. 2 18 Although judicial review of
federal Indian law, "a hodgepodge of statutes, cases, executive orders, and
administrative regulations ... embody[ing] a wide variety of divergent policies, 219
presents, at least in theory, opportunities for courts to identify and champion
expansive conceptions of Indian sovereignty and rights, empirical evidence
suggests that judges in courts of the United States, no matter how sympathetic to
the justice of Indian claims or how receptive to moral or natural legal principles
contrary to positive law, are unwilling or unable to challenge the authority of their
employer in its own courts.2 In other words, the basic institutional arrangements
of the U.S. political and legal order are closed to contestation over, let alone
revision of, the normative foundations of federal Indian law.
In sum, the substance of federal Indian law reflects that the United States
has not repudiated its presumptions of Indian inferiority or its sanguinary history
of expropriation, genocide, and forcible denial of Indian self-determination, while
the process reveals that judges in courts of the United States, with precious few
exceptions, lack the wisdom, moral fiber, or the courage to indulge interstitial
preferences for justice, denounce the preferences of their employer and defend
Indian sovereign rights against majoritarianism. Although the post-Civil War U.S.
legal system cannot fairly be described as "evil," the sub-regime of federal Indian
"law," an artfully designed yet utterly positivist cloak that dresses military might in
judicial garb, ensures that the "red man's entitlements, 2 ' are subordinated to and
ultimately destroyed by non-Indian interests and institutions steeped in
218. Fuller, supra n. 181, at 109.
219. Porter, supra n. 8, at 902.
220. For every U.S. v. Sioux Nation, there is a score of cases in which the Court declines to repudiate
"old decisions that offend modern sensibilities." Royster, supra n. 107, at 66. See e.g. Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. 371 (overturning the presumption of congressional "good faith" in regards to the taking of
Indian lands long presumed since Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)). Thus, an ever-
burgeoning number of federal Indian law scholars are concluding that the judicial branch is structurally
incapable of ever exercising judicial review in defense of Indian sovereignty. See e.g. Braveman, supra
n. 11, at 116-17 ("The [judicial] slide down the sovereignty slope has gained momentum .... ").
Although "jurisprudential intuitions" rooted in natural law or moral philosophy may fuel the impulse
to afford justice to Indian tribes against the interests of the United States, judges are ultimately more
sensitive to the contrary commitment to vocational security, and their legal decisions reflect their
priorities:
No judge sitting in a court, which is created by a particular sovereign, is allowed to challenge
the legitimacy of the sovereign's act, which put him there in the first place. It is the triumph
of the principle of positive over natural law; it is the force behind the command, not the
soundness of the rule that generates the command, that matters. The judge who happens to
work for the winner, when that winner arrived on the scene in second place, is never in a
position to honor the [claim] of somebody who came first. Instead of appealing to principles
of natural justice that were already accepted within his own system, the judge has to
recognize who calls the shots, and dresses up his predicament with high sounding maxims,
which go on to shape huge portions of the subsequent law.
Epstein, supra n. 212, at 5 (footnote omitted).
Even if a federal statutory provision can be interpreted to permit senior judges to refuse to take
whole classes of cases in which unjust results are preordained, experience and insight into human
nature suggest that there will always be another judge who will accept the federal Indian law case that
his colleague refuses. See 28 U.S.C. §294(b) (2000) (permitting senior judges to assume "such judicial
duties as [they are] willing and able to undertake").
221. Williams, supra n. 19, at 3.
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colonialism and racism. 222 Only a systematic program of decolonization, to include
the denunciation of discovery, plenary power, and the implied divestiture
doctrine, can purify federal Indian law and salvage it from evil.
223
Concluding that existing federal Indian law is indeed an evil legal system
does not absolve the theorist from proposing an alternative theory of law to
govern relations between Indian nations and the United States. Part V offers such
a theory.
V. BEYOND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN A
NATURALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. From Sovereigns to Subordinates: Indigenous Peoples and the Rise and Fall
of Naturalism in International Legal Theory
From its earliest origins in the late Middle Ages through the early nineteenth
century, international legal theory was dominated by naturalism,224 and
international legal scholars, notwithstanding gradually accreting examples of
contrary practice, asserted that indigenous peoples had the same universal moral
rights and duties under international law as non-indigenous peoples, including the
right to be left in peace to enjoy the freedom with which they had been endowed
by nature22' and the duty to respect the territorial integrity and political
independence of all other law-abiding nations.226
However, with the emergence of the modern state-based system after the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international law began a long, slow devolution that
gradually displaced indigenous peoples from the pale of civilization. By
substituting the will of the state as the ultimate source of all laws, international
222. See Porter, supra n. 8, at 903 (attributing the "destruction of Indigenous culture and the
eventual assimilation of Indian people into American society" to the pernicious effects of "federal
Indian control law," a term employed to indicate normative rejection of federal Indian law).
223. See id. at 899, 991-98 (calling for the "decolonization" of "colonial federal Indian control law"
through the formal recognition of the territorial jurisdiction of Indian nations over all civil and criminal
matters unimpeded by states and the federal government and repeal of a welter of statutes burdening
Indian sovereignty and land ownership).
224. See e.g. Thomas Hobbes, De Cive 47 (Howard Warrender ed., Clarendon Press 1983) (insisting
that relations between men and nations were governed solely by the "Fundamental Law of Nature");
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo (James Brown Scott ed., C.H. Oldfather &
W.A. Oldfather trans., Oceana Publications 1964) (holding that natural law was the sole source of
legally binding international norms and describing international law as a subset of natural law); Vattel,
supra n. 33, at 4 (insisting that states are bound to obey the "Law of Nations," which is "that law which
results from applying the natural law to Nations"); Id. at 116 ("Those ambitious European States which
attacked the American Nations and subjected them to their avaricious rule, in order. . . to civilize them,
and have them instructed in the true religion-those usurpers, I say, justified themselves by a pretext
equally unjust and ridiculous.").
225. See e.g. Vattel, supra n. 33, at 57. For an examination of the natural legal heritage of indigenous
rights, see Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 Ariz. L.
Rev. 739 (1990).
226. See Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past 32 (elaborating universal rights and
duties recognized by naturalist international legal theory); see also Epstein, supra n. 212, at 12
(stressing that naturalist international legal theory is predicated upon the principle of voluntarism and
the absence of coercion in interstate relations).
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and domestic, and by granting states free rein to redefine the juridical status of
indigenous nations from coequal sovereigns to subordinate groups subject to
national laws or to positivist international legal principles such as the discovery
doctrine, 227 positivism swept away the barricades defending the sovereignty of
indigenous peoples. Without denying the binding force of natural law entirely,
early positivist international legal theorists conflated Christianity and civilization
and pronounced the existence of two separate and distinct international legal
systems to reflect and legitimize the invasion of indigenous lands and the
colonization of indigenous peoples.
The first, governed by natural law, was reserved to the community of
"Christian nations of Europe" by virtue of the "vast superiority of their
attainments in arts, and science, and commerce, as well as in policy and
government. ''228 The second, to which all non-Christian, non-European people
were relegated by virtue of their alleged lack of civilization, 22 and in particular
their supposed inability to "fully understand the Law of Nations and to take up an
attitude which is in conformity with all the rules of law,",23° was governed by the
positive laws of Christian states under whose dominion they could lawfully be
2311drawn in consequence of their barbarism.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the legal philosophy of positivism
began to emerge as the regnant paradigm in international law, incrementally
banishing the natural legal principle that manmade laws inconsistent with the
dictates of reason deduced from observation of the divinely orchestrated natural
world were of no legal force and substituting the manifested will of sovereign
states as the exclusive source and form of international legal norms.23 2 Because
sovereignty, rather than nature, was now the source of international law, and
227. See M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (defining the discovery doctrine).
228. James Kent, Commentaries on American Law vol. 1, 3 (2d ed., 0. Halsted 1832).
229. See Oppenheim, supra n. 33, at 35 (excluding Persia, Siam, China, Abyssinia, "and the like"
from the realm of the natural international legal order because they had failed to "raise their
civilization to the level of that of the Western" states).
230. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise vol. 1, at 148 (1st ed., 1905).
231. In other words, claims that non-Christian peoples were uncivilized became the philosophical as
well as the legal basis for colonization:
When people of European race come into contact with American or African tribes, the
prime necessity is a government under the protection of which the former may carry on the
complex life to which they have been accustomed in their homes .... Can the natives
furnish such a government, or can it be looked for from the Europeans alone? In the answer
to that question lies, for international law, the difference between civilisation and the want
of it.
Accordingly international law has to treat such natives as uncivilised.
John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 141, 143 (Cambridge U. Press 1894).
232. See e.g. John E. Noyes, Christianity and Theories of International Law in Nineteenth-Century
Britain, in Religion and International Law 235-58 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1999) (describing mid-nineteenth century transition from naturalism to positivism as
the reigning international legal paradigm); Oppenheim, supra n. 230, at 92 ("We know nowadays that a
Law of nature does not exist. Just as the so-called Natural Philosophy had to give way to real natural
science, so the Law of Nature had to give way to jurisprudence, or the philosophy of the positive law.
Only a positive Law of Nations can be a branch of the science of law.").
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because "civilized" states no longer regarded them as sovereign, indigenous
nations were now, at least de jure, mere objects, rather than subjects, of
international law.233 Consequently, to the extent that indigenous peoples retained
any rights whatsoever, the responsibility for the protection of these rights was "left
to the conscience of the state within whose recognised territorial sovereignty they
are comprised, the rules of the international society existing only for the purpose
of regulating the mutual conduct of its members."''  In short, positivist
international legal scholars deliberately disfigured international law to ratify the
invasion of foreign lands and the destruction of the de facto sovereignty of
indigenous peoples.235
B. International Indigenous Rights Regimes: A False Promise
The philosophical changing of the guard from the justice-centered approach
of natural law to sovereignty-centric positivism in the discipline of international
law, along with the practice of states over the course of the last two centuries,236
has not passed without remark. Critics of the erosion of natural law as the
philosophical basis for international legal theory have excoriated the turn,
wrought by positivism, away from the exercise of human reason and the
participation of individuals possessed of inalienable rights in the (re)discovery of
principles of eternal and immutable justice.237  Naturalist international
jurisprudence has enjoyed a revival of sorts since the middle of the twentieth
century, as a number of scholars, particularly in the fields of human rights and
international relations theory, began to demand that international law be
reintroduced to justice and morality and reconfigured to provide a more secure
233. See e.g. Cayuga Indians Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 173, 176 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1926).
(holding that an Indian nation "is not a legal unit of international law"); Island of Palmas Case (Neth.
v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 858 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925) ("[C]ontracts between a State ... and native princes
or chiefs of peoples not recognized as members of the community of nations . . . are not, in the
international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and obligations ...."
(emphasis omitted)). Some commentators, so enamored of positivism, extended it so far as to
effectively revise history, claiming, contrary to well-settled fact, not only that Indian nations were no
longer fully sovereign but that "American Indians have never been regarded as constituting persons or
States of international law[.]" Oppenheim, supra n. 230, at 19 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
234. Westlake, supra n. 231, at 136.
235. See Anaya, supra n. 17, at 9-38 (evaluating the positivist legal justifications for European
conquest of the Americas, Asia, and Africa).
236. The seventeenth-century French philosopher Blaise Pascal may have presaged the rise of
positivism by more than a century in commenting that "[it is a singular thing to consider that there are
people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have made laws for
themselves which they strictly obey[.]" Blaise Pascal, Pensees 424 (Philippe Sellier ed., Pocket 2003).
However, positivism did not displace natural law from its theoretical dominance in international law
until the nineteenth century. See Frederick Pollock, Essays in the Law 63 (Macmillan & Co. 1922)
(noting that "all authorities down to the end of the eighteenth century ... have treated [international
law] as a body of doctrine derived from and justified by the Law of Nature").
237. See e.g. Sherston Baker, First Steps in International Law 16-17 (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trobner &
Co. 1899); John Westlake, International Law vol. 1, 14-15 (Cambridge U. Press 1910). It should be
noted that not all critics of positivism in international law regard themselves as naturalists. See Allen
Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 21
(Oxford U. Press 2004) ("[It is possible to develop a coherent, defensible, systematic, and practically
useful view about how the international legal system ought to be, without embracing a naturalist view
of what international law is.").
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legal foundation for the expression and protection of inalienable rights, known
alternatively as "natural rights" or "human rights.",238  For "new natural law"
theorists, there are limits to lawmaking: states, although sovereign and the authors
of domestic law, are no more at liberty to proclaim moral wrongs as legal
obligations than they are to criminalize the exercise of human rights, and
considerations of justice along with the application of practical reason to collective
social problems, requiring the structuring of legal relationships between
individuals, peoples, and states.239 Indeed, this restructuring is ongoing, with
indigenous peoples as participants: over the last half century, the International Bill
of Rights240 has progressively infused international law with a cultural and social
character, 24 and the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
has restated a series of entitlements to self-determination, culture, and economic
development inhering in indigenous peoples which indigenous groups claim limit
state discretion and impose affirmative duties, independent of the recognition or
contrary interests of states, as a matter of customary international law.242
238. For an excellent analysis of "new natural law" scholarship, see for example, Robert P. George,
In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford U. Press 1999). For examples of such scholarship, see for example,
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford U. Press 1980); Leo Gross, The Peace of
Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. Intl. L. 20 (1948); Fernando R. Tes6n, A Philosophy of International
Law (Westview Press 1998).
239. For a discussion of the invigoration of natural legal philosophy in the field of human rights, see
Hall, supra n. 22, at 302 (explaining that the new natural law school challenges the theoretical
foundations of the power of states to "hinder[] or prevent[] the enjoyment of... natural rights"). But
see Matthew A. Ritter, Universal Rights Talk/Plurality of Voices: A Philosophical- Theological Hearing,
in Religion and International Law 417, 426 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1999) (querying "whether [human] rights talk is an appropriate language for speaking
natural law").
240. The International Bill of Rights is the collective term for the various human rights legal
instruments that have recognized individuals and in certain cases groups as endowed with a series of
negative and affirmative rights legally enforceable against state and, arguably, nonstate actors. The
primary components are the U.N. Charter arts. 55 and 56, which commit member-states to promote
"conditions of economic and social progress and development ... without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion"; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948), which amplifies the Charter; the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A16316 (1976), article 27 of which prohibits states from denying ethnic, religious, or linguistic
minorities the "right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language"; and ICESCR, supra n. 15, at
art. 1, which recognizes that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination," to include the right to
"freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," that "[a]ll peoples may ... freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources .... ," and that "[i]n o case may a people be deprived of
its own means of subsistence."
241. See Suagee, supra n. 17, at 683 (describing the evolution of human rights in three generations,
with the first the eighteenth-century diminution of state sovereignty permitting individuals to be
subjects of international law endowed with civil and political rights, the second the post-World War II
introduction of treaty-based civil and political rights secured by state nonintervention as well as the
introduction of affirmative state obligations to ensure certain economic and social benefits, and the
third the shift at the end of the twentieth century to international concern with the protection of
collective rights and transnational interests).
242. Perhaps the most encompassing and contested provision of the Draft Declaration proclaims that
"[i]ndigenous peoples have the right of self-determination" by virtue of which "they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Draft
Declaration, supra n. 15, at art. 3.
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However, while rights discourses have expanded in recent years, and
although a number of commentators and, more importantly, some states now
accept in theory that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determine as
distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious communities,243 little meaningful,
substantive redefinition of international law has transpired. Despite recognition
and limited remediation of past depredations against their indigenous peoples by
several liberal states, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the United
States,244 recognition and enforcement of the rights of indigenous peoples, even in
international fora, remains a largely aspirational undertaking, 245 and the
destructive treatment of indigenous peoples remains a phenomenon too much
with us.
That this is so represents a failure not of legal imagination but of political
will: only paleopositivists and the basest of rogues-think Slobodan Milosevic and
Saddam Hussein-would contest the claim that states are morally and legally
obligated to exercise their sovereign powers in a manner compatible with the
promotion and respect of basic human rights of all those within their territorial
jurisdiction.246  However, because indigenous peoples call into question the
territorial legitimacy of their host states247 and present competing culture- and
resource-based claims, they pose political, economic, and social threats to the
majority communities that wield legal power in the states now surrounding them.
Thus, although the pendulum of international legal theory may once again be
swinging toward naturalism, settler-states cling to positivism as a defensive tactic
against the fundamental political and legal transformations demanded by
indigenous peoples and deliberately preserve international law as inhospitable
terrain for redress of claims brought by indigenous peoples for violations of their
natural legal right to self-determine.248
243. See supra n. 15 (defining self-determination under international law).
244. See When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human
Injustice 3 (Roy L. Brooks ed., N.Y.U. Press 1999) (describing the recent efforts by a host of liberal
states to recognize and remedy the gross human rights violations committed against their indigenous
populations).
245. See Western Sahara, supra n. 15, at 86-87 (stating, in dictum, that, although it is not any longer
an independent source of law, natural law "is ... the concept which should be adopted today" to
govern the relations between indigenous peoples and states).
246. See Buchanan, supra n. 237, at 247 (regarding this normative claim as the most fundamental and
universal principle within the corpus of contemporary international law).
247. Richard Herz, Legal Protection for Indigenous Cultures: Sacred Sites and Communal Rights, 79
Va. L. Rev. 691, 691-92 (1993) (noting that indigenous groups "tend to undermine political and social
stability by creating an orthodoxy in competition with that of the dominant culture" that "undermines
the state's claim to territorial sovereignty as well as its status as the representative of all citizens").
248. So jealous are states of their sovereign prerogatives that they refused to permit the Draft
Declaration-currently under discussion by United Nations Human Rights Commission-from
reaching the General Assembly for a vote, even though that instrument is arguably designed to
promote autonomy, rather than independence. See Erica I.A. Daes, Dilemmas Posed by the UN Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Autonomous Assembly of Indigenous Peoples, 63
Nordic J. Intl. L. 205 (1994) (examining, in the context of drafting the Draft Declaration, the hostility
of many state to the recognition of any rights whatsoever in their indigenous peoples).
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C. Reclamation of Indian Sovereignty: Toward A Naturalist International Legal
Theory
The following nine foundational postulates comprise a naturalist
international legal theory of Indian sovereignty:
(1) Indian nations are fully sovereign, coequal members of the international
legal system that predate the settler-state erected around them. As a consequence
they are entitled to exercise sovereignty unbounded by the discretion of the states
within which they have been subsumed and unlimited by any power or ideology
on earth save for the fundamental norms of international law that restrict the
sovereign prerogatives of all states through the operation of human rights regimes
and humanitarian legal instruments.
(2) Indian nations enjoy the natural right to be left in peace to enjoy the
freedom with which they had been endowed by nature, and they are impressed
with the corresponding universal duty to respect the territorial integrity and
political independence of all other law-abiding nations.
(3) Any theory of international law that embraces the primacy of the
contemporary system of states to the injury of indigenous prior sovereigns, and in
particular the legal authority of the United States over the affairs of Indian
peoples within, thereby contravenes the natural legal rights of Indian peoples.
(4) Federal Indian law, an applied positivist theory of international law
territorially limited by the boundaries of the United States 249 and designed to
facilitate and ratify centuries of military and judicial assaults on indigenous
sovereignty, has degenerated so far from its naturalist roots as to merit the brand
of an evil legal system.
(5) As a matter of international law, Indian nations' sovereignty predates
and trumps the sovereignty of the settler-state that now asserts power over
them-notwithstanding the contrary pronouncements of the legislature or courts
of their conqueror. Accordingly, recognition of the full international legal
personality of Indian tribes requires simply the restoration of natural legal rights
that predate the modern states system rather than a contemporary creation of
international law or a delegation of power from other states.
(6) Indian sovereignty, as a natural legal entitlement, cannot be divested
save for in an overt, voluntary, and mutually agreed-upon manner consistent with
natural international legal principles, such as by a treaty procured without fraud or
duress.u °  Forcible deprivation of Indian sovereignty, as well as judicial
249. Scholars have long recognized that federal Indian law is less a creature of the U.S. Constitution
than a perversion of natural international legal theory. See e.g. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of
Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 Geo. L.J. 1, 17 (1942) ("[O]ur Indian law originated,
and can still be most clearly grasped, as a branch of international law .... ).
250. Most of the treaties between the United States and Indian nations ceding lands and powers of
sovereignty to the United States were secured through fraud and duress, and the terms of many others
are patently unconscionable. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the
Conqueror, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 753, 763-66 (1992) (describing the making of two such treaties); Stephen
L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes: The Basic ACLU Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights, 26 (2d
ed., S. 11. U. Press 1992) (same).
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pronouncements of implied divestiture, are ineffective as a matter of domestic and
international law.251
(7) As a logical consequence of the premise that Indian nations possess and
are entitled to the unimpeded exercise and enjoyment of their sovereignty and full
international legal personality, "nearly every law made by Congress and nearly
every case decided by the Supreme Court over the last two centuries seeking to
impose or sanctioning the imposition of power over [Indians] is invalid.,252
(8) The United States has international legal duties to rescind and repudiate
laws and judicial opinions purporting to impede the recognition and free exercise
of Indian sovereignty and to recognize Indian nations as sovereigns.2 For the
breach of these duties, Indian nations are entitled to a remedy.
(9) Should the United States refuse to voluntarily renounce its unilateral
claims to govern Indian country without the consent of the governed,255 secession
and the declaration of formal legal and political independence is a lawful option
for those Indian nations that should elect it.
The exposition of a naturalist international legal theory of Indian
sovereignty is but the first step. Major legal and social transformations require not
merely a "theoretical advance" but a "political event" that operationalizes thought
and translates it into action.256 The next part suggests the form such a political
event might assume and responds to anticipated criticisms.
251. Others have suggested that although early United States-Indian treaties are woven through with
evidence of fraud, duress, and unconscionability, ensuring respect for Indian sovereignty need not
require the total reconstruction of these treaties but rather that they simply be observed by the United
States. See Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 Am. Bar Found. Research J. 1, 65
(1987) (calling upon the United States to reconstruct relations with Indian nations on the basis of the
original treaties); Porter, supra n. 8, at 949-50 (stating that "[r]espect for tribal sovereignty and the
right of self-determination dictates that the United States limit its authority over the Indian nations to
the degree bargained for in the original treaties").
This article, building on the work of other scholars, proposes a more radical solution: Indian
treaties should be subject to revisitation, reconstruction, and even renunciation as void. See e.g.
Friedman, supra n. 49, at 559 (taking this position).
252. McSloy, supra n. 129, at 219.
253. Several scholars conclude that, as a matter of customary international law, states inhabited by
indigenous peoples may have the obligation to recognize them as independent states where they
possess specific territories, exercise governmental authority over those territories, and have the
capacity to enter into international relations. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the
1990s: From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 33, 75 (1994) (suggesting
obligations of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be read to confer
international legal personality upon indigenous peoples); Makau wa Matua, Why Redraw the Map of
Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 Mich. J. Intl. L. 1113, 1125 (1995) (noting practice "favors the
requirement that an entity be treated as a state if it attains the qualifications of statehood").
254. It is a general principle of law common to all legal systems that for every breach of a duty there
is a remedy at law. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,162-63 (1803).
255. One prominent scholar would allow the United States a last opportunity to "engage in one final
colonial act," specifically the adoption of a "Decolonization Policy" that would result in the statutory
repeal of major portions of federal Indian law, before approving of unilateral Indian action. Porter,
supra n. 8, at 1000.
256. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge & Politics 103 (Free Press 1975) (presenting a theory of
political and legal transformation that proceeds in two stages: "theoretical advance" and "political
event").
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VI. DISSOLVING THE POLITICAL BANDS: AN AMERICAN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
More than 228 years ago, the founding fathers of the United States
concluded that King George III, by interfering with the legal sovereignty of
various states and imposing alien rule by force,"' perverting the independence of
the judiciary,5s immunizing the criminal depredations of aliens, 25 imposing
absolute rule,260 and declaring war,26' had made it "necessary ... to dissolve the
Political Bands which .. .connected them with [Great Britain], and to assume
among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws
of Nature and of Nature's God entitle[d] them., 262 Although, contrary to the
pretensions of federal Indian law, Indian nations are not, as were the colonists,
subjects of the power that has long visited upon them a train of abuses and
usurpations, the deeply-entrenched presumptions of domestic dependency and
plenary power, coupled with a litany of similarities between the founders'
experience under British rule and the history of United States-Indian relations,
invite comparative analysis.
As if by serendipity, United States v. Lara presents a near-perfect heuristic to
examine the proposition that Indian nations find themselves in circumstances
strikingly similar to those faced by American patriots in 1776. To wit, by
depriving Indian nations of the authority to prosecute most aliens who commit
crimes that threaten their sovereignty and physical well-being, and by threatening
the potential deprivation of what jurisdiction remains with the specter of plenary
power, federal Indian law, an alien construct built to justify and perpetuate
colonial rule from afar, has shorn Indian nations of legal sovereignty just as
effectively as British royal proclamations divested American colonists of theirs.
Moreover, although the smoke of the Indian Wars has long cleared, just as in the
run-up to the Revolutionary War, King George III ensured that British military
power stood bristling, visibly prepared to deter and defeat American attempts to
assert autonomy rights against the crushing force of British "law." U.S. military
power lurks behind each and every one of the pronouncements of the courts of the
conqueror-M'Intosh, Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Oliphant, Lara, and every
257. See Declaration of Independence [ 3, 10, 15, 23-24] (1776) (listing reasons for the decision to
sever political association with Great Britain, including that King George III had "refused his Assent
to Laws ... necessary for the public Good," "obstructed the Administration of Justice," "combined
with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our
Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation," "abolish[ed] our most valuable Laws,
and alter[ed] fundamentally the Forms of our Governments," and "suspend[ed] our own Legislatures,
and declar[ed] [himself] invested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever").
258. See id. at [ 11] (complaining that King George III "has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone").
259. See id. at [ 17] (complaining of the policy of "protecting [British subjects], by a mock Trial,
from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States").
260. See id. at [ 22] (complaining that King George III had "establish[ed] [in the colonies] an
arbitrary Government... [of] absolute Rule").
261. See id. at [ 25] (noting that King George III had "declar[ed] us out of his Protection and
wag[ed] War against us").
262. Declaration of Independence at [ 1].
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other federal Indian law case-and is poised to intervene to suppress Indian
sovereignty by force should Indian nations ever cease playing their assigned roles
in the held-over farce that is federal Indian law.
Accordingly, if the descendants of the political community that authored the
U.S. Declaration of Independence and defended it by force of arms would have us
understand that decision as the legitimate and necessary response of a subjugated
people while stubbornly remaining "deaf to the [v]oice of [j]ustice[,],, 26 3 logic
would suggest that Indian nations, in whom sovereignty was vested long before
the arrival of Columbus and whose claim to independence thus does not require
the division of a political community as did the claim advanced by the thirteen
colonies, might well consider following suit and issuing their own American Indian
Declaration of Independence ("AIDI"). 264 Indian national delegates would gather
to place their signatures upon a document that, out of "a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind" would "declare the causes which impel them to the
Separation.",26' Delegates would "let Facts be submitted to a candid World",266 in
support of the AIDI, including a written recitation of the dishonorable history of
United States-Indian relations, and in particular the litany of overt acts committed
by the United States in derogation of the natural legal rights of Indian nations to
exercise sovereignty. Having dissolved any political connections to the United
States, delegates would have signed copies of the AIDI delivered to the President,
to Congress, and to the Supreme Court, and Indian nations, once again fully
sovereign and possessed of "full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
Independent States may of right do, 267 would stand prepared to "hold the rest of
Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends.',268 Thenceforth, all those who enter
the territory of Indian nations, except for those with immunity under international
law,269 would be subject to the jurisdiction of Indian nations, and federal Indian
law, from M'Intosh to Lara, will join Dred Scott in the pantheon of legal
270abominations.
263. Id. at [ 31].
264. At least one tribe has purported to declare independence and seek recognition of that
independence from other states and international organizations. See e.g. Vine Deloria, Jr., Behind the
Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence 77-78 (Delacorte Press 1974)
(describing the declaration by Russell Means in 1973 that the Oglala Sioux Nation was independent
from the United States, would defend its treaty-guaranteed borders, and would seek recognition).
However, no broad-based, strategic effort by a consortium of tribes pursuing not merely military but
political and legal avenues toward independence has ever been mustered.
265. Declaration of Independence at [ 11.
266. ld. at [ 2].
267. Id. at [ 32].
268. Id. at [ 31].
269. Under international law, certain classes of persons, most typically diplomatic personnel, are
cloaked in immunity from the exercise of national jurisdiction, and would thus be immune from the
exercise of Indian nations postindependence. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 59 Stat.
1031, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (Apr. 18, 1961) (codifying in treaty form the customary international legal
regime according immunity to diplomatic personnel).
270. The primary effect of AIDI is to restore political sovereignty and all the powers of self-
government to those Indian tribes who sign it; because sovereignty is a political, more than a territorial,
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VII. INCREMENTALISM, ACCOMMODATIONISM, AND ASSIMILATIONISM:
ANTICIPATING AND RESPONDING TO THE ANTI-SECESSIONISTS
A. Anti-secessionism: Criticisms and Proposals
In the past decade alone, the international community has been presented
with a series of crises, from Eritrea to Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Kurdistan, and
Kashmir, wherein religious and ethnic minority groups respond to violent
governmental repression of their aspirations to autonomy by attempting to secede
from their states of nationality. While gross and systematic violations of the
human rights of minority groups often catalyzes secessionism, few of these
struggles have proven successful, for in the perennial conflict between the core
values of justice and peace, there are those who, desirous of avoiding chaos and
mayhem at any price, will always turn a blind eye to the former. Moreover,
international law is notoriously conservative of the status quo, and although most
commentators circa 2005 now accept in theory that the legitimacy of a government
is a measure of the degree to which it represents the will of the governed 271' and
that the era of unmitigated state sovereignty has been truncated by the emergence
of the human rights regime, in practice few will countenance any challenges to the
right of governments to exercise power within their borders,272 and fewer still will
273bless the dissolution of states in the name of self-determination.
concept, the emphasis of AIDI is not on land dominion but rather on self-determination. Subsequent
negotiations toward land claims settlements designed to restore to Indian sovereignty vast lands
expropriated from Indian tribes would follow in due course. See Bradford, supra n. 196 (discussing the
form and substance such negotiations might take).
271. See Buchanan, supra n. 237, at 234, 243 ("[T]he dominant view on the legitimacy of the state" is
that it must represent the will of the governed and that it is the consent of the governed that "morally
justifies the government in wielding political power."). For a deeper discussion of the question of
political legitimacy, see Jurgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spdtkapitalismus [The
Legitimation Problem in Late Capitalism] (Suhrkamp Verlag 1979).
272. The vigorous and acrimonious debates accompanying intervention in Kosovo and Iraq reveal
that humanitarian intervention remains a very much contested principle in international law. See e.g.
Symposium, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 Am. J. Intl. L. 553-642 (2003)
(presenting diverse opinions as to the lawfulness of intervention in Iraq). A minority of scholars, and
at least one state supreme court, conclude that the right of secession, and the corresponding duty of
other states to intervene in support of secession, should be recognized provided that a formal
international arbitral body determines that the state of nationality is culpable for the gross and
systematic rights violations at issue, that secession is the remedy of last resort, and that the beleaguered
minority will govern democratically. See e.g. Reference re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 37 I.L.M. 1340,
1369, 1372-73 (Can.) (holding that "International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession
nor the explicit denial of such a right" but that the "territorial integrity of existing states" is a
fundamental principle and that the right to secession can only accrue where "the ability of a people to
exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated"); Buchanan,
supra n. 237, at 358-60 (elaborating a theory supporting the right to secession under international law).
Clearly, the "total frustration" test poses a high threshold.
273. See e.g. Morton H. Halperin, David J. Scheffer & Patricia L. Small, Self-Determination in the
New World Order 60 (Carnegie Endowment for Intl. Peace 1992) (noting general international distaste
for secession); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J.
Intl. L. 177 (1991) (noting that secession only very rarely receives international legal support); Wallace
Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural Sovereignty and the
Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 Stan. L. & Policy Rev. 191, 198 ("[T]o the extent that secession
would threaten the stability of the international order..., the rights of peoples to self-determination
are limited by the sovereignty of the nation-state.").
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Notwithstanding recent declarations of an international duty to protect
populations subjected to systematic rights violations through the unwillingness or
inability of their states of nationality to protect them,274 the principle of
nonintervention enshrined in the United Nations Charter2 75 and in customary
international legal declarations276 still, in practice, trumps any international duty to
intervene or to recognize a countervailing right, arising out of state malfeasance or
nonfeasance, to secede.277 Thus, unilateral assertions of rights to withdraw
territorially from the established public order, even when reinforced by evidence
that secession is vital to the preservation of life, are born into an unfriendly
international legal milieu and, particularly when advanced by groups claiming
sovereignties that predate and challenge the settler-states erected around them,
can expect little if any transnational support.278
Anti-secessionist opponents of the AIDI are likely to cluster into three
broad camps: incrementalists, accommodationists, and assimilationists.
1. Incrementalism
Incrementalists are identified by their commitment to the principle that the
legitimacy of social and legal arrangements does not require perfect justice and
their devotion to the conclusion that self-determination implies the pragmatic
promotion of liberty rather than an absolute right to upset international order and
tranquility in their quest for independence. For incrementalists, the definition of
sovereignty is susceptible of multiple interpretations and at least partly dependent
upon situational and cultural context,27 ' and a wide spectrum of possibilities,
274. See Indep. Intl. Commn. on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response,
Lessons Learned 185-98 (Oxford U. Press 2000) (summarizing lessons learned from the Kosovo
conflict and concluding that states have a duty to refrain from casting adverse votes in the UN Security
Council in the setting of humanitarian interventions to prevent impending and grave threats to human
life).
275. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (providing that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state"); id. at art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.").
276. See e.g. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra n. 15, at 121, principle V (refusing to authorize or
encourage "any action which would dismember or impair... [state] territorial integrity").
277. Buchanan, supra n. 237, at 430 (surveying practice and reaching the conclusion that the principle
of nonintervention is as yet formally undented by any contrary principle).
278. Ideological conflicts over the right to secession are exacerbated by practical conflicts over the
questions of entitlement to self-determination, the extent of the right, the process whereby the popular
will is to be ascertained, and remedies available for denial of the right. See e.g. An Agenda for Peace:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, at 18 (1992)
("if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to
fragmentation"); Harold S. Johnson, Self-Determination within the Community of Nations 71-98 (A.W.
Sijthoff 1967) (discussing difficulties in determining who is allowed to express self-determination and
what forms self-determination may take). The assertion of Indian rights to self-determine invariably
prompts contestation-political as well as theoretical-over the appropriate resolution of these issues.
See Berkey, supra n. 30, at 78 ("To say that the right of self-determination is part of contemporary
international law raises more questions than it answers for Indians .... ").
279. See Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 Stan.
L. Rev. 1311, 1346 (1993) (contending that the meaning of sovereignty "is not entirely shared across
particular groups . . . or cultures" and is in practice "a function of interpretive acts by those who
possess it and those who seek it").
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including territorial autonomy, international guarantees of minority rights, and
even forms of personal-as distinct from territorial-autonomy, are often
appropriate substitutes for statehood.280  The inherent tension between the
sovereignty of existing states and the aspirational principle of self-determination
of peoples can and should, according to exponents of an incremental approach, be
tamed through institutional forms other than the proliferation of newly
independent states.
In the context of Indian nations, incrementalists thus prefer to unhitch
secessionism from the concept of self-determination in order to offer more limited
forms of political and legal authority.28' Conceiving of sovereignty as a substantive
legal status and of self-determination as merely the procedure whereby peoples
who meet certain qualifications choose from among various international legal
statuses, of which sovereignty is but one, 2 incrementalists urge Indian tribes to
abandon independent statehood and to instead select from a prescribed palette of
internal sovereignty or intrastate autonomy alternatives the option that best
permits the expression of "collective difference. 283
a. Treaty-Based
The most expansive institutional arrangements for reconstructing the
relationship of Indian tribes to the United States would allow Indian nations to
exercise authority over all issue areas, save for defense and foreign policy,284 to the
280. See Katangese Peoples' Congress v. Zaire, ACHPR/RPT/8h/Rev.1, Annex VI, Comm. 75/92, at 9
(1994-95) ("[S]elf-determination may be exercised [as] independence, self-government, local
government, federalism, confederalism, [or] unitarism.") (available at http://www.hrni.org/files/case
lawfHRNi_EN_474.html); Anaya, supra n. 17, at 83-84 (noting redress of historical violations of self-
determination rights of indigenous peoples does not necessarily require reversion to status quo ante or
formation of new states); Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (U. Pa. Press 1990) (surveying and analyzing the various forms
of autonomy and minority rights regimes that have been proposed as alternatives to secession and
statehood); Tes6n, supra n. 238, at 127-56 (contrasting justifications for indigenous rights to self-
determine through statehood with liberal critiques).
281. Put somewhat more coarsely, answering the question of whether Indians and other indigenous
people are entitled to international legal personality "does not call for a yes or no answer"; for
incrementalists it is a matter of degree. Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical
Personality?, 79 Am. Socy. Intl. L. Procs. 189, 199 (1985) [hereinafter Indigenous Populations]
(remarks of Robert T. Coulter).
282. See e.g. Coffey & Tsosie, supra n. 273, at 198 (differentiating sovereignty and self-determination
on this basis (citing Anaya, supra n. 17, at 85)).
283. Macklem, supra n. 279, at 1348. Although they concede the injustice of the process whereby
Indian sovereignty has been diminished, incrementalists are unwilling to conclude that Indian nations
are by virtue of that injustice necessarily entitled to statehood. See e.g. id. at 1359 ("Nor does
concluding that European nations violated the formal equality of Indian nations, and that indigenous
peoples ought to occupy the position they would have occupied had no violation occurred, necessarily
lead one down the path to the inevitable creation of independent states.").
284. See Buchanan, supra n. 237, at 416 (arguing that the legal foundation for Indian autonomy is "in
basic principle no more problematic than the case for restoring sovereignty to states that have been
unjustly annexed," such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Kuwait, and the Baltics); Deloria, supra n.
264, at 161-86 (endorsing such a proposal); Rosen, supra n. 35, at 256 ("Just as nation-states like
Sikkim, Monaco, and the Vatican have agreements by which their defense or foreign policy is
contractually assigned to another state, so, too, encouragement could be given through international
agencies to the apportionment of some sovereign powers among indigenous groups and surrounding
states." (footnote omitted)); Maivin Clech L6.m, At the Edge of the State: Indigenous Peoples and Self-
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limits of their territorial boundaries, and would commit the international
community to monitoring compliance with and mediating disputes arising from
such agreements. 285  So long as they refrain from asserting foreign or military
policies at odds with the United States,286 tribes, envisioned as protectorates of the
United States or even as asymmetrical confederates under such autonomy
arrangements, would be afforded international legal guarantees of security in their
legal rights to govern no matter how normatively divergent from Anglo-American
practice the substance or process of that governance.287 Neither the substance nor
process of Indian justice-criminal, civil, or regulatory-would be within the
purview of the United States, 2  and non-Indians entering Indian territory would
impliedly consent to Indian jurisdiction. 89
Such guarantees might be negotiated and codified in treaty form,290
simultaneously granting to tribes objective proof of their restoration to full
291international legal personality and ensuring their sovereignty against the states
while specifying procedures for the joint exploitation of natural resources and for
cooperation in the exercise of transborder jurisdiction.292 In other words, although
tribes would surrender some of the sticks from the bundle of sovereign powers by
accepting autonomy agreements, they would be guaranteed in the exercise of
those that remain.
Determination 190 (Transnatl. Publishers 2000) (proposing an arrangement similar to the agreement
between the Federated States of Micronesia and the United States).
285. Buchanan, supra n. 237, at 358.
286. Some incrementalists would permit Indian nations to directly engage international
organizational fora, including the United Nations and arbitral tribunals, and solicit developmental
assistance from states without U.S. mediation. See e.g. Indigenous Populations, supra n. 281, at 192
(remarks of Howard R. Berman).
287. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Tribal Governments and the Encounter, in The Unheard Voices:
American Indian Responses to the Columbian Quincentenary 1492-1992, at 157, 161-62 (Carole M.
Gentry & Donald A. Grinde, Jr., eds., Edwards Bros. 1994) (advocating a strong theory of tribal
autonomy that would guarantee tribal self-governance even against legal challenges brought by critics
of the normative practices of tribal sovereigns). Of course, Indian tribes would be constrained by
human rights regimes, including conceivably the United Nations Charter, and by norms of jus cogens.
288. See Kalt & Singer, supra n. 14, at 5 (describing Indian "self-rule," whether attained through
treaty or statute or some other process, as complete legal and economic autonomy).
289. In the unlikely event the United States should determine that the assertion of Indian jurisdiction
over non-Indians is politically unacceptable, Congress might enact, or update, the series of non-
intercourse acts criminalizing non-Indian entry into Indian country. See e.g. Indian Non-Intercourse
Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified in contemporary form at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)) (establishing a
licensing system for U.S. citizens desiring to enter Indian lands and trade with Indian tribes and
criminalizing unlicensed entries and trading).
290. Resumption of treaty-making with Indian nations would require the repeal of a federal statute.
See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000) (providing that "[n]o Indian nation or tribe ... shall be acknowledged or
recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty").
291. Because the power to make treaties is delegated expressly to the federal government, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution forbids states from interfering with the authority of the United
States to make and enforce treaties and any necessary legislation implementing treaties. Mo. v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Treaties between the United States and Indian nations would thus
create a domain reserve expressly denying states any power over Indian affairs.
292. See Rosen, supra n. 35, at 256 (describing such arrangements as a form of "contractual
sovereignty").
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b. Legislative
Legislative incrementalists suggest that less expansive autonomy agreements
ceding defense and foreign affairs powers to the United States and reserving most,
but not all, of the other concomitants of sovereignty to Indian tribes might be
constructed not by treaty but rather through the U.S. domestic political process,
albeit with symmetrical Indian participation. Under federal law, the borders of
Indian nations would be guaranteed by a statute that would further guarantee
Indian real property against uncompensated takings and expressly create robust,
judicially-enforceable remedies for violations of the trust doctrine;2 93 in exchange,
Indian nations, as the price of official entry into the U.S. federalist system, might
294
agree to afford certain due process guarantees to non-Indians in Indian courts.
The United States would remain in a trust relationship with Indian nations but
would no longer possess plenary power over Indian internal affairs and would be
obligated by its contractual agreements to exercise its powers as trustee and its
foreign affairs and defense powers for the benefit of Indian sovereigns. 95
2. Accommodationism
Accommodationists concede that while Indian sovereignty, even in the form
of independent states, is not without moral and even legal justification, "what
ultimately matters is .. . the de facto exercise of sovereign powers[,29 6 and
because U.S. domestic political considerations will likely prevent the sort of major
legal transformations necessary to effectuate autonomy, let alone independence,
Indian nations should recalibrate their sights and accept the best of all possible
worlds. Simply put, Indian nations can never be like Canada or Mexico: they are
domestic dependent, rather than sovereign, nations,297 and all they can hope for is
to preserve their cultural, religious, and spiritual heritage while influencing the
293. Deloria, supra n. 264, at 252-58; Cross, supra n. 50, at 373 (identifying an independent,
judicially-monitored, and enforceable trust doctrine as a primary objective of the quest for Indian self-
determination).
294. A federalist proposal to associate tribes with the United States and the states similar to what
legislative incrementalists suggest was considered in an early treaty between the Delaware Tribe and
the United States that would have created a state, with representation in Congress, populated by one
or more tribes. See Treaty with Delawares (Sept. 17, 1778), 7 Stat. 13, at art. VI:
And it is further agreed on between the contracting parties should it for the future be found
conducive for the mutual interest of both parties to invite any other tribes who have been
friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present confederation, and to form a
state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress.
295. See e.g. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, supra n. 212, at 75-80 (proposing the
substitution of a negotiated relationship between the United States and tribes in which the United
States abandons the plenary power doctrine but continues to exercise external powers of sovereignty
for the present legal regime).
296. Kalt & Singer, supra n. 14, at 6 (emphasis in original) (distinguishing between de recto, de jure,
and de facto sovereignty and arguing that, because of U.S. domestic political considerations, Indian
nations can realistically attain only the latter).
297. See Prakash, supra n. 212, at 1071-72 (finding that plenary power defeats the claims of most
Indian tribes to independence from the United States).
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exertion of plenary power.2 8 Despite the normative issues it raises, the history of
United States-Indian relations has acquired a life and logic of its own, rendering
the "disentanglement" of Indian nations from the United States a practical
impossibility. 299 For accommodationists, plenary power has morphed into more
than a judicial justification for congressional practice; it is an insoluble glue that
binds Indian nations to the United States, and Indian nations must learn to live
with and adapt to it.
3 °°
An accommodationist program would thus steer clear from questions of high
politics to center instead upon the protection of Indian rights to language, religion,
and internal self-governance against assimilative pressures and against abrogation
of reserved rights to engage in traditional Indian cultural practices.3 1 Congress
would exercise its plenary power to pass legislation permitting enforcement of the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act in federal courts,3 °2 creating additional
trust-based programs to nurture and protect Indian culture and language,3 °3 and
overturning case law interfering with the authority of Indian tribes to exercise
those aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction necessary to protect their cultural
patrimony (potentially requiring not merely a Duro fix but Oliphant and Montana
298. See Cross, supra n. 50, at 371-72 (encouraging Indian nations to accept domestic dependent
status but to invest this status with claims to U.S. protection of Indian cultural and social differences);
see also Coffey & Tsosie, supra n. 273, at 195-96 (calling for a "reappraisal of the tribal sovereignty
doctrine" that deemphasizes political independence in favor of the defense of "cultural sovereignty"
against a "multitude of forces that threaten the cultural survival of Indian nations" (emphasis
omitted)).
299. Resnik, supra n. 78, at 134; see also Frickey, supra n. 109, at 11 ("The United States resulted
from a colonial process that cannot be undone at this late date, no matter the normative concerns that
might be raised about it.").
300. See Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams' Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 437 (1988) (stating
that "I can live with the plenary power").
301. Coffey & Tsosie, supra n. 273, at 196; see also Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-
Determination: An Overview, in Indian Self-Rule: First Hand Accounts of Indian-White Relations from
Roosevelt to Reagan 191 (Kenneth R. Philp ed., Howe Bros. 1986) (positing Indian cultural uniqueness,
and the defense of Indian cultures, as the primary justification for the preservation of a distinct
political and legal status for Indian nations).
302. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, passed "to protect and preserve for American
Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise.., traditional religions," lacks
any enforcement mechanisms, and Indian plaintiffs have never won an AIRFA case. Pub. L. No. 95-
341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000)). Consequently, Indian tribes and
individuals are burdened in the exercise of their religion when such exercise involves the use of
controlled substances or the hunting of charismatic fauna. See e.g. Empl. Div., Or. Dept. of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990) (refusing to apply the compelling state interest test to a
state general prohibition on the use of peyote by members of the Native American Church and
subjecting Indian religion to the "political process"); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (finding in the
legislative history and text of a federal criminal statute extending protection to eagles clear evidence of
congressional intent to exercise plenary power and abrogate the reserved right of the Yankton Sioux to
hunt eagles); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting procedural requirements of
U.S. environmental legislation narrowly to divest the Makah Tribe of their reserved right to take
whales).
303. Several trust-based federal programs already afford Indian culture and religion some support.
See e.g. Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (2000); Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000); American Indian Religious Freedom
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996.
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fixes as well). 304 Enhanced tribal powers to exercise jurisdiction to protect their
culture and their internal powers of self-governance against external threats would
not come without cost: in exchange, Indian tribes would accept federal judicial
review of the exercise of their jurisdiction 305 along with the obligation to explain
and justify their decisions,3°6 and defendants in Indian courts would be entitled to
the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts to challenge violations of the entire
panoply of constitutional protections.3 7
Still, for accommodationists the embrace of plenary power is an
unobjectionable, if somewhat ironic, necessity to the preservation of Indian
culture. Plenary power is not absolute, and federal judges do not treat federal
Indian law as a "deconstitutionalized" genre "wall[ed] off ... from mainstream
constitutional discourse. ' 3°8  Rather, accommodationists maintain that federal
judges, even when sitting in review of federal Indian law cases, can and do restrain
the exercise of congressional and executive power over Indian tribes by remaining
faithful to the spirit of the institutional role carved out of the constitutional text by
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.3°9 Although judicial robes do not
invariably drape their wearers in wisdom or moral judgment, because the judiciary
is "structurally distinct from [and] potentially able to sit in judgment of and to
impose limits in the name of law, 310 on the political branches, judges, even as they
pay proper homage to congressional plenary power, can identify and implement
principles indigenous to the U.S. legal system, as well as those born of the human
rights movement and incorporated in domestic law, that are more respectful of
304. See e.g. Braveman, supra n. 11, at 114 (suggesting specific legislation to expressly expand
inherent tribal civil and regulatory jurisdiction); Resnik, supra n. 78, at 90 (advocating congressional
legislation to restore authority to Indian tribes to prosecute all persons, to the extent of tribal
territorial jurisdiction, with caveats and limitations). The specific question of whether this latter
category of legislation would restore, or delegate, power to Indian tribes, although essential to the
holding in Lara, is of minor import to accommodationists. See e.g. Coffey & Tsosie, supra n. 273, at
194 (noting that many accommodationists counsel Indian nations to lobby Congress for affirmative
delegations of the jurisdictional powers courts have withheld).
305. See Resnik, supra n. 78, at 127 (demanding that the federal "judicial role as arbiter of
constitutional boundaries affecting individual liberties" be applied generally to the review of tribal
court proceedings).
306. See e.g. Rosen, supra n. 35, at 254 (requiring, if Indian courts are to be "allow[ed].. . to
develop," that they "articulate the reasons for their decisions").
307. The Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") limits tribal powers to define and punish offenses and
imposes substantive due process provisions of Article III and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution upon tribal governments. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303
(2000). Accommodationists call for amendments to ICRA, as well as a federal habeas corpus statute
that reaches tribes, to further limit the law enforcement powers of tribal governments. See e.g.
Prakash, supra n. 212, at 1118 (insisting that Congress may exercise plenary power to prevent Indian
nations from ""oppress[ing]" nonmembers); Resnik, supra n. 78, at 91-92 (demanding the "ability of
the national government to create law enforcement regimes that override local judgments ,by... tribes
... and the insistence on respect for individual liberty" and a "federal law of habeas corpus" that allows
individuals detained by Indian tribes to object to the legality of their confinements).
308. Resnik, supra n. 78, at 83.
309. Id.; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1987) (finding parts of Indian Land Consolidation Act
to pose an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment)); Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (holding in dictum that the
"'power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute"' (quoting
U.S. v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40,54 (1946)).
310. Resnik, supra n. 78, at 84-85.
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tribal self-governance and that preserve to tribes a meaningful quantum of
sovereignty."'
To promote their program, accommodationists urge Indian nations to view
themselves as parties in an interdependent, rather than a subordinate,
relationship, in which the senior partner can be encouraged to afford them a
heightened level of respect.312 Indeed, the United States has already blessed
"internal self-determination," defined as the power of Indian nations to "make
their own decisions on a range of issues from taxation to education to land
resources management[,]" as a proposal with which it is "quite comfortable." '313
Through a dialogic, or even a reconciliatory process, it may be possible to secure
the legislative reforms necessary to harness plenary power and the trust doctrine
in service to Indian cultural sovereignty. 314 To push for a broader "re-order[ing]
[of] international relationships within a sovereign democratic [United States],"3 5
however, will drop Indian sovereigntists a bridge too far into contested legal and
political terrain, with devastating consequences as soon as their opponents
unlimber plenary power and counterattack.316
3. Assimilationism
For over a century, federal Indian law and policy has promoted assimilation
to facilitate the seizure of tribal lands and resources, eliminate contending
governmental entities, and eradicate alien modes of economic development and
worship.317 For assimilationists, the solution to the Indian problem is not to bow
311. See e.g. Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 Ariz. St. L.J. 889
(2003) (crediting the federal judiciary with the capacity to mitigate plenary power on behalf of tribes);
Student Author, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 Harv. L. Rev.
1751, 1751 (2003) (suggesting that federal Indian law is sufficiently nebulous that federal judges can
successfully import principles and doctrines from international human rights law as interpretive norms
and policy guidelines without giving the political branches offense).
312. See Resnik, supra n. 78, at 134 ("[A] more cheerful thought is to locate all these [Indian] nations
as inter-dependent sovereigns.").
313. UN Commission on Human Rights, Remarks by U.S. Delegate Luiz Zuniga, Item 15: Indigenous
Issues, http://www.treatycouncil.org/section_2114171121611.htm (Apr. 8, 2004).
314. For a discussion of the transformative potential of a process of reconciliation between the
United States and Indian nations, see William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: Justice as Indigenism, 23
Hum. Rights Rev. - (forthcoming 2005).
315. Id.
316. The phrase "a bridge too far" is a reference to Operation Market Garden, a plan intended to
capture the Arnhem River and thereby liberate Holland from the Nazis during World War II which
failed, with extremely heavy casualties, because overly optimistic Allied military planners
miscalculated and dropped airborne forces too deep-precisely "a bridge too far"-behind enemy
lines. See Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (Simon & Schuster 1974).
317. Two such policies deserve specific mention. The first, House Concurrent Resolution 108,
exercised plenary power to "make the Indians ... subject to the same laws and ... responsibilities as
are applicable to other citizens of the United States, land] to end their status as wards." 83d Cong.
(1953) (reprinted in 67 Stat. B132) (repealed 1988) (authorizing administrative and congressional
action to terminate tribes in California, Florida, New York, and Texas). Termination ended the U.S.
trust relationship with over 100 selected tribes, curtailed federal services, dissolved tribal governments,
and distributed former tribal lands on a per capita basis. Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The
Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 139, 140, 151 (1977) (identifying 109
terminated tribes). Termination has been partially reversed: thirty-one previously terminated tribes
have been reinstated to federally-recognized status. See e.g. Oklahoma Indians Restoration Act of
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to Indian claims to self-determine but to resume and accelerate the integration of
Indians within the U.S. body politic.
Although they accept in theory that individuals have the basic human need
to belong to groups "united by some common links-especially language,
collective memories, continuous life upon the same soil," and perhaps "race,
blood, religion, [and] a sense of common mission, 3 8 assimilationists reject Indian
nations as mere "partisans of small-scale community"" 9 lacking in any entitlement
to "special support or assistance or to extraordinary provision or forbearance"
310
from the United States. Rather than encourage an "artificial" commitment to
tribalism, assimilationists would require Indian cultures to "wither away," to
"amalgamate with other cultures," and to "adapt themselves to geographical or
demographic necessity."32' This "'mongrelization' of [Indian] identity" will, for
assimilationists, serve a cosmopolitan vision that broadens the scope of individual
life possibilities and serves as a "more authentic response to the world in which we
live,'0 22 and the loss of Indian culture and the right to self-govern as discrete and
insular communities are at worst of trivial moral or legal consequence and at best
1977, 25 U.S.C. § 861 (2000). However, many tribes remain terminated or unreconstituted, and their
members are now divested not only of primary sources of political allegiance and economic sustenance
but of sacred sites and other fonts of cultural renewal.
Predicated upon the misapprehension that the emerging Indian problem was rooted in
segregation and parochialism rather than a cascade of assimilative legislation, the second policy,
"Relocation," directed federal agencies to relocate individual Indians to urban industrial centers. Pub.
L. No. 959, ch. 930, 70 Stat. 986 (1956). At a time when reservations were increasingly unable to
provide material necessities, Relocation, by portraying "contented Indian[s] working at good jobs and
sitting beside televisions and refrigerators [in Northern cities,]" induced an exodus to magnet urban
areas. Larry W. Burt, Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-1961, at 78 (U. N.M. Press 1982)
(identifying Indians with leadership skills as targets of Relocation). More than 35,000 were relocated
after signing an agreement that they would never reestablish residence on reservations. Atkinson,
supra n. 28, at 409. Relocation proved to be a cruel assimilative hoax: a generation of the Indian best
and brightest were dumped into substandard housing and menial employment. See Robert Burnette &
John Koster, The Road to Wounded Knee 182 (Bantam Bks. 1974) (noting institutionalized housing
discrimination against urban Indians). Because off-reservation Indians who do not enroll as tribal
members are, for reasons of physical and social distance, unable to participate in the languages,
lifestyles, and communities constituting Indian identity, many relocated Indians were quickly
subsumed in the American melting pot. Wells, supra n. 50, at 5-6.
As with many other dimensions of U.S. Indian policy, many assimilationists attach benign
purposes to their proposals: "friends of the Indian" suggest assimilation is promotive of racial and
ethnic harmony. See e.g. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America (Whittle Direct Bks.
1991); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural
America, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 993 (1995). This "benign assimilationism" flies in the face of culturally
deprived, economically dependent urban Indians, who, as a consequence of their inability to
participate meaningfully in either traditional tribal or majoritarian societies, suffer physical and mental
ills. See Laurence Armand French, The Winds of Injustice: American Indians and the U.S. Government
xvi (Garland Publg. 1994) (discussing challenges facing assimilated urban Indians); Wells, supra n. 50,
at 61 (correlating increased incidence of Indian social pathology with assimilationist policies that
divided kinship groups and divested Indians of culture).
318. Isaiah Berlin, Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx and the Search for Identity, in Against the Current:
Essays in the History of Ideas 252, 257 (Henry Hardy ed., Hogarth Press 1980).
319. Jeremy Waldron, Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform
751, 778 (1992).
320. Id. at 762.
321. Id. at 787-88.
322. Id. at 788 (quoting Salman Rushdie, In Good Faith, in Imaginary Homelands 393, 394 (Granta
Bks. 1991).
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are even promotive of the individual rights and life possibilities of individual
Indians. Accordingly, assimilationists totally reject the notion that Indian nations
are entitled to self-determine in any fashion, let alone as independent states, and
the trajectory upon which Congress and the Court have set federal Indian law,
particularly over the last quarter century, is, although hostile to Indian
sovereignty, for that reason to be applauded rather than challenged.
B. Responses
1. Incrementalism
Anti-secessionists may well be correct in pointing out that "[g]iven the
changes forced upon Indian people during the last 200 years, there has been a
commensurate change in the native conception of sovereignty., 32 3 Colonization
has "transformed tribal conceptions of self-government," and "some Indian
nations may simply have no idea what it means to assume greater authority over
their own affairs. 3 24 There is no greater degree of similarity as between any two
Indian tribes than there is between two members of the European Union:
theorists of Indian sovereignty must not make the error of treating tribes as if they
are fungible.3u2 Moreover, there is no hard evidence that, given a choice,
independence and all that status entails will be the preferred end-state of each of
the more than 550 Indian nations, 326 and self-determination is, after all, about the
right to make free and independent choices.327
Nevertheless, incrementalism places too much faith in the honor of the
United States. While the prospect of the resumption of treaty-making might well
herald a new era of mutual respect and fair dealings, the United States has
honored none of the hundreds of treaties it entered into with Indian parties, and
there is little reason to believe that in regard to any autonomy agreements the past
will prove other than prologue. Moreover, the political question doctrine will
surely deny Indian parties any remedies in U.S. courts in the event of future
breaches of autonomy treaties,328 and international law has not yet developed to
the point where remedies unavailable in domestic courts would be assured in
323. Porter, supra n. 8, at 1001.
324. Id.
325. See Prakash, supra n. 212, at 1109 (describing the treatment of tribes as if they were fungible as
a primary error committed by scholars of federal Indian law).
326. In fact, empirical evidence indicates that most indigenous peoples prefer autonomy to
independence. Suagee, supra n. 17, at 692 ("Most indigenous peoples do not seek recognition as
independent states, but rather seek to establish ... autonomy within their traditional territories."
(citation omitted)).
327. One renowned Indian scholar envisions, as part of the translation of self-determination rights
from theory into practice, that Indian nations be permitted to choose either the preservation of the
status quo-domestic dependency, plenary power, and a judicially-unenforceable trust-or an
arrangement that affords a greater measure of sovereignty. See Porter, supra n. 8, at 1000.
328. See e.g. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (upholding congressional plenary power to abrogate an Indian treaty
by express intent); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (dismissing suit
challenging presidential power to abrogate a treaty absent congressional participation as a
nonjusticiable political question).
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international fora.32 9 Legislative autonomy arrangements offer Indian nations
even less security in the enjoyment of sovereign rights, for congressional plenary
power always looms large over the exercise of those vestiges of sovereignty that
survive such agreements. In sum, as seductive as autonomy might be to Indian
nations denied the right to self-determine for many generations, neither renewed
treaty-making nor its legislative equivalent will completely withdraw Indian
330
sovereign rights from the U.S. political process.
2. Accommodationism
Asking Indian tribes to shelve their dreams of coequal sovereignty and trust
Congress and the courts to be more judicious in the exercise and review of plenary
power, as accommodationists do, is akin to inviting them to a bad bargain with the
Devil, with their souls as consideration for the fleeting fortune of unmolested
internal self-governance. Congress, and the courts, are flummoxed by the sui
generis status of semisovereign entities within U.S. national borders and cannot
devise any legal or moral theory whereby to comprehensively resolve this "Indian
problem." Consequently, such an arrangement will last only so long as Congress
and the Court deign to maintain it; once it becomes too expensive, or too
uncomfortable, or too inconvenient, plenary power will cut it down like wheat
before a scythe.
In fact, such an arrangement will surely have a short half-life. The
application of Indian law over Indian territory, an essential aspect of the Indian
culture accommodationists purport to hold dear,331 will remain a point of conflict
between Indians and accommodationists, who openly envision a role for federal
judges in the "ongoing process of negotiating and renegotiating what the [United
States] will and will not tolerate. 332  If Indians are so desperate to exercise
internal powers of self-governance that they will concede that whether they
maintain a matrilineal or patrilineal culture333 or employ banishment to discipline
329. Several scholars have articulated that a right to autonomy has crystallized within the
international legal corpus, and the Draft Declaration does support the right of indigenous peoples to
"freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." Draft Declaration, supra n. 15, at art.
3; see also Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts 177 (U.S. Inst. Peace Press
1996) (describing various theories operationalizing a right to autonomy under international law).
However, although international law is in transition, conventional sources do not yet provide clear
support for such a right, let alone procedures for determining when the exercise of the right is
appropriate and what groups may exercise it. See Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9
Eur. J. Intl. L. 599 (1998) (concluding that international law is only very gradually and very generally
coming to acknowledge that some peoples may be legally entitled to benefit from intrastate autonomy
agreements).
330. See Wildenthal, supra n. 154, at 145 (warning that Indians are "wise not to rely on [either]
approach alone").
331. See generally William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal Peacemaking in Indian Dispute
Resolution, 76 N.D. L. Rev. 551 (2000) (theorizing that tribal legal systems are an essential aspect of
Indian culture that functions to maintain social adhesion and prevent conflict within Indian
communities).
332. Resnik, supra n. 78, at 132.
333. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (refusing to interpret ICRA to authorize
suit against a tribe or its officers seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a tribal ordinance denying
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juvenile offenders 34 is any legitimate business of federal judges, they will have
misunderstood the true meaning of sovereignty. If they subject their culture to the
normative evaluations of the majority of another sovereign, they will have kicked
open the door to its destruction.
The reasons for these assertions are perhaps less than obvious but easily
revealed. Contrary to the central tenet of legal liberalism upon which
accommodationists rest their theory, the legal and political interests of Indians are
distinct from other racial and ethnic groups: Indians do not seek opportunities to
integrate with the majority but rather the right to opt out the better to conserve
their culture and their sovereignty.335 Experience teaches that when "pervasively
dissimilar cultures are yoked together" within a liberal' nation-state, minority
cultures, particularly where organized along communitarian rather than
individualist principles, as are Indian nations, systematically lose legal rights to
self-determination. 36  By dint of numbers, majorities dissatisfied with Indian
internal self-government need only tap into the political process to stifle what
troubles them.337 In essence, liberal law and politics, and in particular the synergy
of plenary power and majoritarianism, account for the systematic suppression of
Indian self-governance and the persistent legal disabilities attached to the
expression of Indian culture.
In sum, accommodationists fail to realize that Congress and the courts
cannot be permitted the power to define the boundaries of Indian sovereigrty
membership in the tribe to children of female members who marry outside the tribe but extending
membership to children of male members who marry externally).
334. See State v. Roberts, 894 P.2d 1340 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1995) (refusing to delay sentencing for a
battery conviction to permit tribal elders to use banishment-a traditional punishment-for
rehabilitative purposes).
335. As U.S. Senator and Northern Cheyenne Ben Nighthorse Campbell explains, "Indians are
totally different [from other minority communities]. They [have] everything to lose [from
assimilationism]. The primary driving force of American Indians is not to gain what the majority
culture has. The primary driving force is not to lose any more than they've already lost." "A Long
Time Coming": Prominent American Indians Reflect on Their Peoples, Their Past, Their Humor-And
Their New Museum, Smithsonian Mag. 59 (Sept. 2004) (available at http://www.smithsonianmag.si.
edu/smithsonian/issuesO4/sepO4/nmai-history.html).
In other words, the principle of Indian self-determination is in unresolvable tension with the
integrationism informing the civil rights movement and liberal law. Although some minority groups
claim rights to a separate cultural identity, only Indians can claim the right to political autonomy by
virtue of their status as indigenous peoples-a distinct political classification that under international
law recognizes rights transcending those that inhere in "mere" minorities even if U.S. policymakers
conflate the boundary as a matter of domestic law. See Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations:
Intercultural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1615, 1649-51 (2000)
(comparing superior rights of indigenous peoples with rights of minorities under international law).
336. See generally Lawrence Rosen, The Right to Be Different: Indigenous Peoples and the Quest for
a Unified Theory, 107 Yale L.J. 227 (1997).
337. When contested social and political issues cannot be resolved through the marketplace of ideas,
"modem democratic societies provide the last ditch solution of a majority vote." Henry M. Hart, Jr. &
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law vol. I, 667
(tentative ed., Cambridge 1958). However, minority groups, unless they can induce a significant
number of outsiders to adopt their political preferences, systematically lose in democracies. See
generally Ely, supra n. 50, at 135-79 (discussing the "majoritarian problem" inherent in democracies
and advocating constitutional government and judicial review as necessary institutions for the defense
of the fundamental rights of minorities). Federal Indian law ensures that, despite constitutional
government and judicial review, Indians remain subordinated to the political will of the U.S. majority.
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without becoming the font of that sovereignty. The very existence of plenary
power is a perpetual threat to Indian sovereignty. Congress has repeatedly
invoked plenary power to foist one "solution" after another upon Indian nations,
including land tenure programs that pulverized Indian landholdings, 8 tribal
constitutions that shattered Indian legal culture, 339 and termination statutes that
legally eliminated Indians.340 Either Indian nations are sovereign or they are not.
Tribes can no more be a little sovereign than women can be a little pregnant. To
pretend that Indian nations still subject to plenary power are sovereign on the
ground that Congress and the courts du jour are willing to tolerate all those
aspects of Indian culture that do not offend opinion elites within the United States
is to warp the meaning of the word beyond recognition. Even worse, it gives
offense to the natural legal principles upon which the founders of the United
States rested their claim to independence while breathing life into the colonialist
and racist presumptions undergirding the foundations of federal Indian law.
3. Assimilationism
Assimilationism is the abnegation of Indianism and a very thinly veiled
recipe for ethnocide.341 As an abject rejection, rather than a thoughtful critique, of
Indian independence, assimilationism merits little herein by way of a response
other than to note that its principle instruments-plenary power and judicial
review-are identical to those of accommodationism but that its normative vision,
unlike that of accommodationism, is manifestly hostile to Indian culture.
Consequently, assimilationism cannot fairly be treated as a theory of Indian self-
government but must rather be regarded as an aspect of liberal universalism at
best and of ethnopolitical antipathy, and even racial hatred, at worst.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Many will question whether a call to an American Indian Declaration of
Independence is prudent, or indicated under the circumstances, or whether Indian
nations want independence as opposed to other potential legal and political
transformations that might better suit their specific circumstances and interests.
Various incrementalist and accommodationist alternatives situate Lara under a far
338. See 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. § _). This act
dismembered tribal land masses and abolished Indian reservations as autonomous and integral
sociopolitical entities, resulting in the reduction of Indian acreage from 155 million to 48 million in less
than a half century. For a discussion of this act and its effects, see Atkinson, supra n. 28, at 397-399.
339. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(2000)) ["Indian Reorganization Act"]. The Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") imposed federally-
drafted constitutions on tribes that imported U.S. substantive law and a regime of individual rights
hostile to traditional Indian legal systems while at the same time subjecting tribal governments to
majority rule principles and granting the Secretary of the Interior veto power over almost all important
tribal decisions, thereby subverting Indian legal sovereignty. For an analysis of IRA, see Burnette &
Koster, supra n. 317, at 183-85.
340. See supra n. 61.
341. See San Jose Declaration, supra n. 105 (coining the term "ethnocide" to describe actions with the
effect of destroying indigenous peoples as distinct societies, irrespective of intent).
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gentler light that seems to reveal transformative possibilities within the regimes of
federal Indian law and international human rights that might offer Indians terms
of association with the United States more favorable than the present.
Regrettably, however, not all that glitters is gold.342 Lara does indeed
sparkle in the warm light of the moment-after all, the power to make and
enforce law is at the very essence of sovereignty-but upon reflection it is made of
the same base metals-the discovery doctrine, plenary power, and stare decisis-
from which the entire corpus of federal Indian law has been conjured. The most
skilled legal alchemists cannot transmute the decision into the sign of hope for
which Indian sovereigntists have long been waiting, 343 and to imagine that
decisions rendered within an evil legal system can ever yield up the philosopher's
stone that will revitalize Indian nations and set them on a course to self-
determination is yet further evidence of our misguided psychological dependence
upon the law and moral judgments of their conqueror. 344 What Congress or the
courts offer with one hand they can, and likely will, withdraw with the other when
the temptations of wealth or the moral judgments of a normatively divergent
majority become irresistible, and no amalgam of Western liberal jurisprudence
and international legal positivism yields any substance capable of shielding Indian
nations against the crushing force of plenary power unleashed. Because Indian
sovereignty and plenary power are even less compatible than American self-
government and the royal prerogatives of King George III, Indian sovereigntists
can no more accept continued political association with the United States
tempered by a modest return to the principles and ethos of Worcester as their end-
state than the colonists could hope to mold British-American policy by securing a
limited form of representation in Parliament. In short, independence is both the
cure for colonialism and the necessary condition for self-determination, and
Indians must summon the courage to "shuck off the red man's burden" ' and
stake their claim to it as a natural legal right.
342. All that is gold does not glitter,
Not all those who wander are lost;
The old that is strong does not wither,
Deep roots are not reached by the frost.
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings 167 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994).
343. See Resnik, supra n. 78, at 133 (describing federal Indian law decisions that impose limitations
on the political branches as "signs of hope").
344. As Professors Coffey & Tsosie remind us, "Our continued acceptance of the idea that [Indians']
legal rights depend upon recognition by the very government that has attempted to divest Indian
nations of their sovereignty exemplifies a psychological mode of dependence in which Indian peoples'
reality is contingent upon that of the exterior society." Supra n. 273, at 209.
345. Rudyard Kipling, The White Man's Burden (1899), written in response to the U.S. capture of the
Phillippine Islands in the Spanish American War of 1898 and warning of the perils of imperialism to
the imperial power:
Take up the White Man's burden-
Send forth the best ye breed-
Go.bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild-
20041
63
Bradford: Another Such Victory and We Are Undone: A Call to an American Ind
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
Admittedly, the AIDI might "strik[e] most Americans as either radical or
ridiculous., 346 The act of re-envisioning Indians as citizens of sovereign nations on
a formal legal par with the United States outstrips the capacity of most non-
Indians.347 Over the past two centuries, non-Indians have grown accustomed to
thinking of Indians as non-sovereigns, and many even believe that the Indians "all
went away and died" a long time ago now.3' 4 However, Indian sovereignty enjoys
an existence independent of American popular understandings against which
ignorance has no effect: indeed, Indian sovereignty "is never extinguished... Just
as a woman retains an absolute right not to be raped even as she is subjected to it,
[Indian] nation[s] continue to possess [their] full range of sovereign rights even as
their violation occurs.,
34 9
The American Indian Declaration of Independence is not a declaration of
war. It is a plea for justice with honor, offered in peace, and it need not and
should not be interpreted in such a manner as to provoke conflict between
peoples. If United States-Indian relationships come to advance on the basis of a
recognition of, and respect for, mutual and coequal sovereignties, with disputes
resolved not by coercion and domination but by negotiation and harmonization, a
new era of just peace, worthy of emulation and export to all the corners of the
earth, will follow. The AIDI is pregnant with transformative possibilities if only
the United States will accept the sovereignty of Indian nations and simply stop
enforcing limitations in the exercise thereof.
Still, it is conceivable that the United States might respond to the AIDI with
military force, as it did during the Civil War, when once before it perceived its
territorial integrity to be at risk, to bring Indian nations to heel.350 Certainly, risks
attend the act of declaring independence. 351' However, the AIDI is not intended to
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.
My use of the phrase "red man's burden" is a parody intended to suggest that the struggle to self-
determine under the yoke of plenary power-a "red man's burden"-is at least as burdensome as the
costs of colonialism, and that it is has its roots in the same racial policies that motivated Europeans to
impose their law upon the non-Europeans they encountered.
346. Deloria, supra n. 264, at 161.
347. Id. at 163.
348. John T. McCutcheon, Injun Summer, Chicago Tribune, http://www.tkinter.smig.net/Chicago/
InjunSummer (Sept. 30, 1907).
349. Churchill, supra n. 205, at 39.
350. At least one contemporary constitutional scholar unabashedly references the continued role of
military force as an instrument of federal Indian policy. See e.g. Prakash, supra n. 212, at 1118 (warning
Indian tribes that if they offend or otherwise threaten U.S. political interests, the United States "always
has the military power to intervene and restore order"). Many states currently respond with military
force to the demands by their indigenous peoples for recognition of their rights to self-determine. See
Suagee, supra n. 17, at 674 (surveying government policies regarding indigenous self-determination and
noting the prevalence of military responses); see e.g. CNN, Indians Scuffle with Police in New York,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9704/20/briefs.pmlindian.taxes/index.html (Apr. 21, 1997).
351. Perhaps the risks are overstated. One Indian elder, borrowing liberally from the plot of the
novel and film The Mouse That Roared (1959), advised the author, only half in jest, that the best
strategy for Indian nations might be to declare war on the United States, immediately surrender, and
then demand foreign aid for reconstruction and development. Although the likelihood of general war
with the United States is minuscule, Indian nations have already suffered too much from wars with the
United States, and all the economic assistance in the world would not necessarily yield sovereignty.
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challenge the sovereignty, legitimacy, or the military power of the United States,
or to launch the overthrow of a lawfully constituted government in Indian country,
but rather to light the path to an escape from the adverse moral and material
effects of an evil legal regime and to the restoration of sovereignty to peoples
entitled, under naturalist conceptions of international law, to self-determine. If
the time for independence is not yet upon us, then until the day dawns when once
again Indians are fully sovereign, we must be prepared to scratch the surface of
victories such as Lara to find what lurks beneath and brave enough to resist the
devaluation of the gold of sovereignty into the pyrite of plenary power wearing a
human face.
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